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The enactment of the warranty of habitability in the early 1970s was hailed 
as a revolution in tenants’ rights. Reversing centuries of legal precedent, the doc-
trine established that a tenant’s obligation to pay rent is contingent upon the land-
lord’s obligation to maintain the premises in good repair. Today, nearly fifty years 
later, scholars and advocates frequently observe that the law has not lived up to 
the potential originally envisioned. Yet these observations have been based on weak 
empirical evidence. This Article presents the results of the first rigorous empirical 
study on the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability. Based on statistical  
analysis of over twelve hundred eviction case files and unit-level data matching of 
these files to Housing Code enforcement records, the study finds that the over-
whelming majority of tenants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims do 
not benefit from the law at all. 
The Article makes two significant contributions to the literature on the war-
ranty of habitability. First, it establishes that an operationalization gap exists in 
the law. While prior studies have observed that the warranty appears to be less  
effective than originally envisioned, all suffered from methodological limitations. 
These studies were either based on small, nonrepresentative samples or measured 
the use of the warranty against the entire population of tenants facing nonpayment 
of rent eviction. No study has been able to rigorously assess the use of the warranty 
of habitability in cases where it should be used: those in which the tenant has a 
meritorious claim. This study does so. 
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Second, the Article upends the leading theories for why the warranty of  
habitability is ineffective. These theories posit that tenants are unable to benefit 
from the warranty of habitability because they lack access to legal representation 
and/or because strict requirements exist for assertion of the claim. The findings of 
this study show that neither theory withstands empirical scrutiny. Specifically, the 
data reveal that although legal representation significantly affects a tenant’s like-
lihood of benefiting from the warranty of habitability, most represented tenants 
with meritorious claims still do not benefit from the law at all. The findings also 
demonstrate that the strict procedural requirements cannot explain the law’s  
ineffectiveness—even where the requirements are absent, the law rarely protects 
tenants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ms. J’s apartment in the South Bronx had become truly un-
livable. The bathroom ceiling had collapsed, the walls were cov-
ered in mold, and the entire place was infested with mice.1 There 
were leaks in the bedroom and bathroom that had become so se-
vere that, on multiple occasions, water flooded not only Ms. J’s 
apartment, but also the hallways of the building and neighbor-
ing units.2 Ms. J had called the City to report the problems, and 
inspectors had cited the landlord for violations of the Housing 
Code, but still no repairs had been made.3 Eventually, Ms. J 
stopped paying rent, as was her legal right to do. Since the early 
1970s, the warranty of habitability has established that a ten-
ant’s obligation to pay rent is contingent upon the landlord’s ob-
ligation to maintain the premises in good repair.4 The law states 
that where a landlord fails to maintain the property, the tenant 
is entitled to a rent abatement—a reduction in the amount of 
rent owed.5 Rather than fix the conditions in Ms. J’s apartment, 
 
 1 Request for and Report of Resource Assistant Premises Visit, Beaumont Man-
agement Group, LLC v Jackson, LT-021832-16/BX, *1–2 (NY City Civ filed Dec 21, 2016). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Open Violation Summary Report, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ 
filed Aug 8, 2017). 
 4 See Javins v First National Realty Corp, 428 F2d 1071, 1072–73 (DC Cir 1970). 
The warranty of habitability is often referred to as the “implied warranty of habitability” 
because it is implied in every residential rental agreement. See, for example, id at 1080 
(“[T]he District’s housing code requires that a warranty of habitability be implied in the 
leases of all housing that it covers.”). In New York, the doctrine is typically referred to as 
the “warranty of habitability” because it was enacted by statute. See NY Real Prop Law 
§ 235-b. I use the term “warranty of habitability” or simply “warranty” to reflect this lo-
cal usage and for simplicity of language. 
 5 See, for example, Javins, 428 F2d at 1072–73 & n 3.  
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however, the landlord filed an eviction action against her for 
nonpayment of rent.6 The law contemplates this response and 
allows the warranty of habitability to be asserted as a defense 
and counterclaim to the eviction complaint.7 
The two sides came into Housing Court in July 2016, and 
the judge ordered the landlord to correct the defective condi-
tions.8 The order required the landlord to make the repairs on 
two specific dates in August.9 Yet Ms. J waited at home all day 
both days, and no one ever showed.10 The parties went back into 
court in early September, and the court again ordered the land-
lord to make the repairs—this time, a few weeks later.11 The 
landlord again did not comply.12 This series of events repeated 
itself six more times throughout the fall and winter of 2016, and 
even into the spring and summer of 2017.13 Each time, the court 
ordered the landlord to make the exact same repairs, and each 
time, the landlord ignored the order.14 Eventually, the case set-
tled.15 The landlord still had not made any of the repairs, but 
Ms. J agreed to repay the full amount of the back rent.16 The  
letter of the law had proven meaningless. Despite spending over 
a year in court, Ms. J was unable to effectively invoke her right 
to a rent abatement, nor was she able to use the law to secure 
performance of the repairs. And Ms. J had an attorney.17 
The warranty of habitability was hailed as a “revolution” in 
landlord-tenant law;18 it was expected to provide a “powerful 
 
 6 Petition Non-Payment Dwelling, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ 
filed Apr 1, 2016). 
 7 See, for example, Park West Management Corp v Mitchell, 391 NE2d 1288, 1295 
(NY 1979). 
 8 Stipulation of Settlement, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ filed 
July 27, 2016). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Affidavit of Respondent, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *2 (NY City Civ filed  
July 14, 2017). 
 11 Stipulation of Settlement, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ  
filed Sept 7, 2016). 
 12 Stipulation of Settlement, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ  
filed Oct 26, 2016). 
 13 See Affirmation in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Restore, Beaumont,  
LT-021832-16/BX, *1–5 (NY City Civ filed July 18, 2017). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Abatement Hearing, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ filed  
Jan 12, 2018). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Affirmation in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Restore, Beaumont,  
LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ filed July 18, 2017). 
 18 Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes 
and Consequences, 69 Cornell L Rev 517, 521 (1984). 
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new remed[y] with which the urban poor could compel landlords 
to maintain their buildings adequately.”19 Yet nearly fifty years 
after the warranty’s enactment, to what extent is Ms. J’s experi-
ence typical, and to what extent is it an outlier? This Article 
presents the results of the first large-scale empirical study rig-
orously assessing the extent to which there is a warranty of hab-
itability operationalization gap—a gap between the number of 
tenants with meritorious claims20 and the number of tenants 
who receive some benefit from the claim. Determining that there 
is a large gap, the study explores the reasons underlying it 
through further empirical analysis. The results upend the lead-
ing theories on why the warranty of habitability is underenforced. 
The study was conducted in the largest rental market in the 
country, New York City,21 looking specifically at nonpayment of 
rent eviction cases.22 Data was collected and analyzed to deter-
mine: (1) the overall rate of rent abatements in cases in which 
the tenant has a meritorious warranty of habitability claim; 
(2) whether and to what extent tenants with meritorious  
warranty claims receive other benefits from the claim, such as 
longer periods of time to repay rental arrears or avoidance of 
 
 19 David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 
Cal L Rev 389, 394 (2011). See also Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin, and David J. Guzik, 
The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant 
Reform, 69 Rutgers L Rev 1, 12 (2016) (“Social justice reformers and tenants’ advocates 
heralded the advent of the implied warranty of habitability with great hopefulness.”). 
 20 Cases with meritorious claims were identified based on evidence of conditions of 
disrepair in the unit. For a detailed description of the methodology, see Part III.D. 
 21 According to the 2010 US Census, New York City had 2,146,892 renter house-
holds. See US Census Bureau, New York City Profile of General Population and Housing 
Characteristics: 2010 (2010), archived at https://perma.cc/N8WR-9Y73. Los Angeles, the 
next largest city in the United States, has only 814,305 renter households. See US  
Census Bureau, Los Angeles City Profile of General Population and Housing Characteris-
tics: 2010 (2010), archived at https://perma.cc/8PCK-4SJS. New York City was also se-
lected as the site for this study for a number of other reasons. See Part III.B. 
 22 Although the warranty of habitability may be asserted by tenants affirmatively, 
it is generally understood that the potential of the claim lies in its use as a defense and 
counterclaim in nonpayment of rent eviction cases. Affirmative cases tend to involve 
complicated and lengthy procedural requirements, and access to counsel is limited, as 
legal services providers prioritize representation of tenants who are at risk of eviction. 
See Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a 
Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 L & Soc Inquiry 1058, 1065 (2017). In eviction cases, 
by contrast, tenants are already in court and can simply assert the claim as a defense or 
counterclaim in the case. See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 2–3 n 1 
(cited in note 19). See also Steinberg, 42 L & Soc Inquiry at 1064–65 (cited in note 22) 
(describing the problems involved in pursuing habitability claims both affirmatively and 
defensively).  
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possessory judgments;23 (3) whether and to what extent the war-
ranty functions as a tool within eviction proceedings to secure 
repairs; and (4) whether and to what extent legal representation 
affects a tenant’s ability to benefit from the warranty where he 
or she has a meritorious claim. 
The study was conducted using two unique datasets of non-
payment of rent eviction cases from 2016. The first dataset is a 
statistically significant sample of all nonpayment of rent evic-
tion cases in which the tenant appeared. The second dataset is a 
statistically significant sample of nonpayment of rent eviction 
cases in which the tenant appeared and there were open  
“hazardous” or “immediately hazardous” Housing Code viola-
tions at the unit at the time the case was filed.24 This dataset 
was constructed based on a unique unit-level matching of evic-
tion case data with Housing Code violation data. In total, over 
twelve hundred nonpayment of rent eviction case files were  
collected, reviewed, and coded.25 
The study found that very few tenants with meritorious 
warranty of habitability claims actually benefited from the law. 
Overall, less than 2 percent of tenants who had meritorious 
claims received rent abatements. Perhaps even more astonish-
ing, only 7 percent of tenants whose landlords have been cited 
by the City for hazardous or immediately hazardous Housing 
 
 23 A possessory judgment is a judgment that grants a legal right to possession of 
the unit in favor of the landlord. Judgments in Nonpayment Cases (New York State  
Unified Court System), archived at https://perma.cc/G586-F45F. In order for a landlord 
to regain physical possession of a unit, the landlord must obtain a possessory judgment 
and must be entitled to issuance and execution of the warrant of eviction. Id. Typically, 
settlement agreements that include a possessory judgment also authorize the issuance of 
the warrant of eviction, but stay execution of the warrant to provide the tenant time to 
pay the rental arrears. If a tenant does not pay the arrears by the deadline included in 
the settlement agreement, the landlord is authorized to execute the warrant of eviction 
(in other words, physically evict the tenant) without appearing before a judge. New York 
City Landlords & Owners: Questions & Answers About Housing Court *22 (Access to 
Justice NY State Courts, July 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/RL65-A2GJ. Where a 
settlement agreement does not include a possessory judgment, the landlord must file a 
motion for issuance of judgment upon the tenant’s breach, and the judge must allow that 
motion before the landlord can proceed with the physical eviction. Id. Thus, tenants have 
stronger procedural protections against physical eviction where they are able to avoid 
possessory judgments. 
 24 The Housing Code system in New York City has three classifications of viola-
tions: “Class A” for nonhazardous violations, such as a bathroom door that needs refit-
ting or painting that needs to be done; “Class B” for hazardous violations, such as a de-
fective carbon monoxide detector; and “Class C” for immediately hazardous violations, 
such as the lack of heat or hot water. See NYC Admin Code § 27-2001 et seq. Class A 
violations must be repaired within ninety days, Class B within thirty days, and Class C 
within twenty-four hours. NYC Admin Code § 27-2001 et seq. 
 25 A more detailed description of the study’s methodology is provided in Part III.D. 
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Code violations—a subset of those who had meritorious claims—
received abatements. The findings also rule out the possibility 
that tenants with meritorious claims are reaping other types of 
benefits from their claims. Tenants with meritorious claims are 
no more likely to avoid possessory judgments or to receive longer 
periods of time to repay arrears as compared with tenants with-
out meritorious warranty claims.26 The study also found that 
although tenants are more likely to benefit from the warranty of 
habitability when they have legal representation, the lack of ac-
cess to counsel does not sufficiently account for the operationali-
zation gap. The significant majority—at least 70 percent—of 
tenants who were represented by counsel and had meritorious 
warranty of habitability claims still did not receive a rent 
abatement. Finally, the findings showed that while eviction pro-
ceedings are indeed functioning as a forum to order landlords to 
perform needed repairs, the forum lacks accountability. Specifi-
cally, in 72 percent of cases in which the landlord agreed to 
make repairs in a court-ordered settlement agreement and there 
was a subsequent settlement agreement in the case, the tenant 
reported that those repairs were still outstanding in a subse-
quent court appearance. 
These findings make two broad sets of contributions to the 
scholarly literature on the warranty of habitability. First, the 
findings provide rigorous evidence of the existence of an opera-
tionalization gap in the warranty of habitability. While much re-
search has pointed to problems with the warranty’s implementa-
tion, prior empirical studies have consistently taken one of two 
forms. One set of studies has examined the overall frequency 
with which tenants assert warranty of habitability claims in 
court or receive rent abatements, without distinguishing be-
tween tenants who do and do not have meritorious claims.27 A 
second set of studies has taken the form of nonrepresentative 
observational or case studies that have looked at outcomes 
 
 26 For a detailed description of the meaning and significance of a possessory  
judgment, see note 23. 
 27 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 22–23 (cited in note 19); 
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ 
Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L Rev 533, 547–48 nn 52–54 (1992); Anthony J. Fusco 
Jr, Nancy B. Collins, and Julian R. Birnbaum, Chicago’s Eviction Court: A Tenants’ 
Court of No Resort, 17 Urban L Ann 93, 109–11 (1979); Marilyn Miller Mosier and  
Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of 
Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U Mich J L Ref 8, 42 (1973). 
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among small groups of tenants with meritorious claims.28 This 
study is the first thus far to rigorously examine on a large, rep-
resentative scale the extent to which tenants benefit from the 
warranty of habitability when they have meritorious claims. It 
is also the first study to assess the possibility that tenants use 
the warranty of habitability to obtain beneficial outcomes in 
their cases other than rent abatements. That is, prior studies 
have not examined whether tenants use their entitlement to a 
rent abatement as leverage to achieve other desired case out-
comes, such as longer repayment periods or the avoidance of 
possessory judgments. This study does so. 
Second, the findings of this study debunk the conventional 
wisdom on the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the warranty of 
habitability. Since the warranty’s initial enactment nearly fifty 
years ago, scholars have tried to explain why tenants have not 
appeared to benefit from the law to the extent originally envi-
sioned. The existing scholarship reflects a general consensus 
around two explanations: (1) tenants lack access to counsel, and 
(2) there are onerous legal requirements for asserting a claim.29 
Recent scholarship has also hypothesized that the warranty is 
underutilized in part because judges lack ready access to  
Housing Code violation records.30 The findings of this study  
upend all of these existing theories. 
First, the study finds that legal representation accounts for 
only a small fraction of the overall operationalization gap. While 
many previous studies have analyzed whether tenants who have 
access to counsel are more likely to receive rent abatements or 
raise warranty of habitability claims in court, none has meas-
ured the impact of legal representation specifically where the 
tenant had a meritorious claim.31 This is the first study thus far 
 
 28 See Michele Cotton, When Judges Don’t Follow the Law: Research and Recom-
mendations, 19 CUNY L Rev 57, 67–69 (2015) (noting that many of the fifty-nine cases 
studied involved serious housing code violations recorded in city inspections); Franzese, 
Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 23 n 97 (cited in note 19) (finding that among a 
sample of thirty-one cases studied in which the warranty of habitability was raised, it 
successfully led to repairs in approximately half). 
 29 See Part II. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, and Jonathan Hennessy, 
The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts  
District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 Harv L Rev 901, 931 (2013); Jessica K. 
Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal 
Services, 18 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 453, 494 (2011); Carroll Seron, Martin 
Frankel, and Gregg Van Ryzin, The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor  
Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L & 
Soc Rev 419, 428 (2001). 
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to do so, and the finding shows that while representation mat-
ters, the vast majority of represented tenants who have merito-
rious claims still do not benefit from the warranty. Second, the 
study finds the existence of a large operationalization gap even 
though New York lacks any of the onerous legal requirements 
for assertion of a claim. Thus, while these requirements may 
impose meaningful barriers where they exist, the findings of this 
study demonstrate that they do not sufficiently explain the war-
ranty’s lack of implementation. And finally, the findings also re-
fute the theory that providing judges easy access to Housing 
Code violation records, without more, will serve as a meaningful 
solution to the warranty’s operationalization failures. Code en-
forcement records are readily available to Housing Court judges 
in New York City,32 yet the data show that judges rarely take 
advantage of the opportunity to access them. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I delves into the histo-
ry of the warranty of habitability and explains the policy goals 
that drove its widespread enactment in the 1970s. Part II re-
views the existing theoretical and empirical scholarship on the 
law’s usage. Part III describes the objectives, data, and method-
ology of the study conducted. Part IV presents and analyzes the 
results. Part V describes the significance of these findings for 
our understanding of the warranty’s implementation and the 
reasons for its ineffectiveness. The Conclusion points to direc-
tions for future research. 
I.  EVOLUTION OF THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
The implied warranty of habitability has a nearly fifty-year 
history. First articulated in 1970, the doctrine was adopted with 
the expectation that it would bring transformative change to the 
landlord-tenant relationship. Advocates and scholars believed 
that the law would level the playing field in eviction cases, com-
pensate for ineffectual code enforcement systems, and serve as a 
strong deterrent mechanism against landlord property neglect. 
These expectations were widely shared by advocates, legislators, 
and jurists across the country.33 Following the warranty’s initial 
 
 32 Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 34 (cited in note 19). 
 33 Rabin, 69 Cornell L Rev at 521 (cited in note 18) (noting the deep involvement of 
courts and legislatures in implementing the warranty); Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 
Rutgers L Rev at 12 (cited in note 19) (noting the hopefulness of social justice and ten-
ants’ rights advocates that the warranty would increase the habitability of residential 
dwellings); Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 13 (cited in note 27) (noting the need 
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adoption in the District of Columbia, forty-nine states embraced 
it in an extraordinarily short period of time.34 This Part de-
scribes the social, political, and legal concerns that motivated 
the creation of the warranty of habitability, and then traces its 
judicial and legislative adoption. 
A. Motivations for the Warranty of Habitability 
Prior to the enactment of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, the doctrine of caveat emptor—buyer beware—applied to 
residential rental agreements.35 Landlords had limited obliga-
tions to maintain their units, and thus tenants were largely left 
to their own devices when conditions fell into disrepair. This 
doctrine was rooted in nineteenth-century law that conceived of 
the lease as merely a possessory interest in land.36 A landlord 
fulfilled his or her obligations under the lease simply by convey-
ing the land.37 The tenant then had complete control over the 
land and was responsible for maintaining any structures on it, 
while also assuming unconditional liability for the rent.38 The 
lease contained no implied promises regarding the state of the 
premises being conveyed.39 This scheme developed in an agrari-
an context in which the typical lease had a lengthy term and the 
tenant farmer was as well positioned to make the repairs as the 
landlord.40 
As demographic shifts occurred in the twentieth century, it 
became increasingly clear that caveat emptor was ill-suited to 
 
for reform recognized by commentators, courts, legislatures, and model landlord-tenant 
codes). 
 34 See text accompanying notes 75–78. 
 35 For a more detailed discussion of caveat lessee and early landlord-tenant law, 
see generally Thomas M. Quinn and Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Criti-
cal Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L Rev 225 (1969). 
 36 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 10–11 (cited in note 19). 
 37 See Richard H. Chused, Saunders (a.k.a. Javins) v. First National Realty  
Corporation, 11 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 191, 197 (2004). 
 38 Id. The early common law rules even held tenants liable for rent after the prem-
ises had been destroyed by fire or other natural disasters. See id at 197 n 18. Many state 
legislatures changed these rules by statute in the nineteenth century. Id. 
 39 Id at 198 (“The basic lease—the exchange of possession for rent—was both sub-
stantively and procedurally independent from other contractual terms.”). When leases 
contained other covenants, those covenants were construed to be independent of each 
other, and thus a landlord’s violation of one covenant did not relieve a tenant of his or 
her obligations under another covenant. See id. 
 40 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 12 (cited in note 27). Marilyn Mosier 
and Richard Soble also observe that in an agrarian context the dwellings conveyed were 
simple, and thus repairs were relatively inexpensive. Id. 
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the realities of modern landlord-tenant relationships.41 By the 
1960s and 1970s, overcrowded slums with dilapidated housing 
had come to characterize urban centers.42 Poor tenants faced 
egregious and unsafe living conditions, and extremely few had 
the resources necessary to make the repairs.43 The nature of con-
temporary landlord-tenant relationships also created different 
expectations.44 A tenant renting an apartment usually held a 
short-term lease and expected to receive more than the land it-
self. The tenant instead sought to rent a dwelling equipped with 
utilities and functioning amenities.45 There was a growing 
movement among legal advocates and scholars to modernize  
 
 41 See Javins v First National Realty Corp, 428 F2d 1071, 1074 (DC Cir 1970) (cita-
tion omitted): 
[I]n the case of the modern apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it 
gives him a place to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on 
the third floor of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet below, 
or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his apartment. 
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek “shelter” today, they 
seek a well known package of goods and services—a package which includes 
not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, 
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, 
and proper maintenance. 
Courts also recognized that landlord-tenant law had failed to keep pace with develop-
ments in contract law, where judicial interpretation has “sought to protect the legitimate 
expectations of the buyer and ha[s] steadily widened the seller’s responsibility for the 
quality of goods and services through implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.” 
Id at 1075. 
 42 See id at 1078–79 (noting that “[l]ow and middle income tenants, even if  
they were interested in making repairs, would be unable to obtain any financing for ma-
jor repairs since they have no long-term interest in the property”). Discriminatory feder-
al housing policies severely restricted the housing options available to minority popula-
tions while at the same time facilitating white flight out of cities. The result was that 
minority tenants were forced into a limited supply of urban tenements, and cities be-
came drained of their tax bases as property values plummeted. See Super, 99 Cal L Rev 
at 402 (cited in note 19). 
 43 Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 225 (cited in note 35), observing that 
tenants lived in 
the most wretched living conditions, littered and unlit hallways, stairways 
with steps and banisters missing, walls and ceilings with holes, exposed wir-
ing, broken windows, leaking pipes, stoves and refrigerators that do not work 
or work only now and then. And always the cockroaches, the rats, and the 
dread of the winter cold and uncertain heat. 
Substandard conditions can cause serious physical and emotional harm. See Super, 99 
Cal L Rev at 452 (cited in note 19) (“Chipping and peeling paint at home is the dominant 
cause of childhood lead poisoning, which can profoundly and permanently stunt chil-
dren’s intellectual and emotional development. Asthma is the leading cause of urban 
school absences, and roach, rodent, and mold infestation are leading causes of asthma.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 44 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 12–13 (cited in note 27). 
 45 Id. 
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residential landlord-tenant law to conform to these expectations 
and needs.46 
Housing codes had been enacted in many jurisdictions by 
this time, allowing for landlords to be held civilly and criminally 
liable for substandard conditions in their properties.47 However, 
there was strong consensus that enforcement was lacking.48 The 
costs associated with prosecuting landlords were high, and as 
commentators noted at the time, only “extreme violation[s] [ ] 
ha[d] any chance of being remedied in the major city setting, 
where large numbers of old buildings [we]re deteriorating rapid-
ly.”49 Code enforcement agencies were underfunded and over-
whelmed, and most lacked sufficient adjudicatory resources to 
pursue aggressive litigation.50 The agencies were also reluctant 
to seek criminal sanctions.51 Civil liability, meanwhile, was prov-
ing an ineffective deterrent mechanism because fines were too 
 
 46 See generally Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 Real 
Prop Prob & Trust J 550 (1971). See also Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 239–
49 (cited in note 35). Additionally, the warranty of habitability intended to harmonize 
the decline of caveat emptor in contract law with housing law. See Super, 99 Cal L Rev 
at 400 (cited in note 19). 
 47 Several courts noted that the establishment of housing codes reflected the legis-
lative reversal of the doctrine of caveat lessee. See, for example, Pines v Perssion, 111 
NW2d 409, 412–13 (Wis 1961): 
[T]he legislature has made a policy judgment—that it is socially (and political-
ly) desirable to impose these duties [of repair] on a property owner—which has 
rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied 
warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with 
the current legislative policy concerning housing standards. 
See also Green v Superior Court, 517 P2d 1168, 1175 (Cal 1974) (“These comprehensive 
housing codes affirm that, under contemporary conditions, public policy compels land-
lords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and habitable hous-
ing.”). The development of the doctrine of constructive eviction further contributed to the 
erosion of caveat lessee. See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 12 (cited in note 27). 
Under this doctrine, the tenant is entitled to terminate the lease by vacating the proper-
ty if the premises are in such disrepair that they are unfit for human use. Upon vacating 
the premises, the tenant’s rental obligation ends. However, commentators at the time 
noted that while commercial lessees were in a position to take advantage of this devel-
opment, the law was largely meaningless for residential tenants, for whom no better 
housing options were available if they opted to terminate their current lease. Id. 
 48 For an excellent discussion of current limitations in the enforcement of housing 
codes, see generally Kathryn A. Sabbeth, (Under)enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27 
Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 99 (2019). 
 49 Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 240 (cited in note 35). 
 50 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 414 (cited in note 19). 
 51 Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 240–41 (cited in note 35) (noting that 
“[s]ending landlords to prison is not very popular” and that the moral effect of criminal 
liability remains small: “What about the opprobrium of a conviction? That carries about 
the same sting as a traffic ticket.”). 
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low.52 It was often cheaper for a landlord to pay a court-ordered 
fine than to make repairs.53 Thus, as a mechanism for holding 
landlords accountable for making repairs, code enforcement was 
broadly considered “inefficient and unworkable.”54 It became 
widely understood that the modern realities of rental housing 
demanded a stronger legal tool.55 
Public outrage was also growing at the law’s toleration of 
slum conditions, particularly in urban centers.56 The civil and 
 
 52 See id at 240. 
 53 Id at 241. 
 54 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 402 (cited in note 19). 
 55 See Javins, 428 F2d at 1079–80 (noting that “the findings by various studies of 
the social impact of bad housing has led to the realization that poor housing is detri-
mental to the whole society, not merely to the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily 
indignity of living in a slum”). It was also widely understood that other available mecha-
nisms for holding landlords accountable for property maintenance were insufficient. See 
Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 243 (cited in note 35). The doctrine of con-
structive eviction allowed tenants to break their leases where landlords so badly neglect-
ed the premises that they became unlivable. Id at 242. However, tenants could only ex-
ercise this defense if they actually abandoned the building, essentially defeating the 
whole purpose of raising it. Id. Some jurisdictions also had rent-withholding laws, which 
allowed tenants to deposit their rent into escrow in court rather than pay the landlord 
when they experienced uninhabitable housing conditions, but commentators noted that 
tenants lacked bargaining power to invoke this law once their lease neared expiration. Id 
at 242–43. Moreover, the typical “urban ghetto tenant,” who lived in buildings in the 
worst condition, had tenancy rights only as a “tenant by sufferance.” Id at 243. This 
meant that the tenants most in need of the protection of the law lacked sufficient lever-
age to use rent-withholding on its own effectively. Id. In New York, § 755 of the New 
York Real Property Actions & Proceedings Law (RPAPL) also allowed a tenant to with-
hold rent for lack of services, but this section only applied (and continues to apply today) 
when “a serious violation against the landlord [has been] recorded by a government bu-
reau.” Id at 245. The statute, therefore, does not help tenants with a collection of smaller 
issues in an apartment. Besides withholding of rent, § 302A of New York’s Multiple 
Dwelling Law allows for rental abatement if the landlord fails to supply services, but a 
tenant can only invoke § 302A after suffering from the issue for six months. Id at 247. 
Furthermore, a landlord can prevail at court in a § 302A action simply by repairing the 
major violation and allowing the smaller issues to continue—thus exposing the tenant to 
a defeat in court and “$100 in court costs plus the rent.” Id at 247 (citations omitted). 
Upon critiquing these available mechanisms, Professors Thomas Quinn and Earl  
Phillips proposed treating “the rent as a package containing payment components,” 
which would give landlords an absolute rent floor for possession and allow tenants to 
withhold rent above that floor for service failures. Id at 253. 
 56 See Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 225 (cited in note 35): 
[T]he law in this area is a scandal. More often than not unjust in its preference 
for the cause of the landlord, it can only be described as outrageous when ap-
plied to the poor urban tenant in the multi-family dwelling. . . . Surely the law 
in a civilized urban society cannot tolerate such conditions. But it does! Let 
that be said frankly and without hedging. 
See also Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 402 (cited in note 19) (“Deteriorating housing conditions 
have serious negative effects on surrounding communities: they depress property values 
and hence property tax revenues, contribute to the spread of insect and rodent infesta-
tion, give cities a negative image with visitors, and are correlated with crime.”). 
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welfare rights movements had swept the nation, generating a 
broad set of demands to expand the rights of poor and marginal-
ized groups. As housing conditions were deteriorating and the 
size of urban slums was expanding, this context helped fuel a 
broad tenants’ rights movement.57 Organized tenants held rent 
strikes, picketed, and engaged in other forms of protest to de-
mand improved housing quality and affordability, while also 
standing behind litigation and lobbying efforts oriented toward 
the same goals.58 
The grassroots activism and legal reform efforts for better 
housing conditions coalesced around the goal of establishing an 
implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.59 The  
warranty would make the tenant’s covenant to pay rent mutual 
with the landlord’s covenant to make repairs.60 Thus, where 
landlords did not keep premises in good repair, tenants would be 
relieved of all or a part of their rental obligations.61 Tenants 
would be “deputize[d]” to act as “private attorney[s] general,” 
empowered to impose automatic financial consequences on their 
landlords whenever they failed to address known disrepair.62 
Advocates believed that this scheme of financial liability would 
serve as a much-needed accountability and deterrence mecha-
nism.63 Whereas landlords realistically perceived the threat of 
financial penalties for code violations or damages imposed by af-
firmative litigation to be minor, it was expected that landlords 
would take the threat of losing all rent revenues—imposed 
 
 57 See Mark D. Naison, The Rent Strikes in New York, in Stephen Burghardt, ed, 
Tenants and the Urban Housing Crisis 19, 19 (New Press 1972); Thea K. Flaum and 
Elizabeth C. Salzman, The Tenants’ Rights Movement 3–4, 16–18 (Urban Research Cor-
poration 1969). 
 58 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 13–14 (cited in note 27); Note, Tenant 
Unions: Collective Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 Yale L J 1368, 1392 
(1968). Advocates also sought to prohibit discrimination, impose rent control, limit evic-
tions, and expand subsidies to support affordable housing development. Note, 77 Yale L 
J at 1370–73. 
 59 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 398–99 (cited in note 19). 
 60 Id at 401. This reciprocity was a sharp departure from long-standing common 
law rules that lease terms were substantively and procedurally independent from one 
another. See Chused, 11 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 198 (cited in note 37). Under 
this regime, the landlord’s failure to comply with one obligation could not be used to de-
fend a claim that the tenant breached a different obligation (such as the payment of 
rent). Id. 
 61 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 401 (cited in note 19). 
 62 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 12 (cited in note 19). 
 63 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 403 (cited in note 19). Professor David Super further 
notes that advocacy to establish the implied warranty of habitability was also grounded 
in “a desire to redistribute power, wealth, and income into the hands of low-income  
people.” Id at 402 (citations omitted). 
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without the need for bureaucratic intervention or a drawn out 
court proceeding—much more seriously.64 
B. Establishment of the Warranty of Habitability 
In 1970, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit became the first court to recognize the warranty of habit-
ability.65 In Javins v First National Realty Corp,66 the court held 
that “a warranty of habitability . . . is implied by operation of 
law into leases of urban dwelling units . . . and that breach of 
this warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of con-
tract.”67 The issue came before the court in the context of an 
eviction action for nonpayment of rent.68 The tenants had failed 
to pay rent, and when the landlord brought an eviction case 
seeking possession on that basis, they asserted as a defense that 
they were relieved of their rental obligations because the land-
lord had failed to make needed repairs.69 
Before Javins, “the only nonprocedural defenses [to non-
payment of rent eviction] had been payment of the rent claimed 
and constructive eviction.”70 The court in Javins, however, both 
 
 64 See id at 403 (noting further that this threat “would be much more likely to  
motivate landlords to make concessions to their tenants in the form of needed repairs”). 
 65 Javins, 428 F2d at 1072. 
 66 428 F2d 1071 (DC Cir 1970). 
 67 Id at 1072–73. The Court reasoned that the outdated principle that a lease conveys 
only a possessory interest in land “may have been reasonable in a rural, agrarian society,” 
but was no longer sensible “in the case of the modern apartment dweller.” Id at 1074. 
 68 The Javins litigation arose out of a rent strike waged by poor tenants living in 
deplorable conditions in a low-income, minority neighborhood of Washington, DC. See 
Chused, 11 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 206–10 (cited in note 37). The tenants had 
no heat for six weeks in winter and were facing a host of other conditions that the land-
lord was refusing to address. After a series of protests and sit-ins at government offices, 
none of which compelled the landlord to make repairs, twenty-nine tenants collectively 
organized and sent a letter to the landlord declaring that they were withholding rent 
until the conditions were repaired. The landlord began suing tenants for possession and 
won, which caused other tenants to surrender their withheld rent. Six tenants, however, 
continued to strike, and their eviction cases eventually became those that were taken up 
on appeal in Javins. For a detailed description of the events that led to the Javins litiga-
tion, see id at 194–210. 
 69 Javins, 428 F2d at 1073. Specifically, the tenants “alleged numerous violations of 
the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or [a] claim by way of recoupment or 
set-off in an amount equal to the rent claim, as provided in the rules of the Court of  
General Sessions.” Id (quotation marks omitted). The tenants claimed 
[t]hat there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of 
the District of Columbia in the building . . . where defendant resides[,] some af-
fecting the premises of this Defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tend-
ing to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to 
the damage of Defendants. 
 70 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 10 (cited in note 27). 
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recognized the implied warranty of habitability as a legal doc-
trine and held that it could be invoked as a substantive defense 
in a nonpayment of rent eviction. The court declared that “the 
tenant’s obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord’s 
performance of his obligations, including his warranty to main-
tain the premises in habitable condition.”71 It explained that in 
adjudicating whether the landlord had a right to possession of 
the apartment for nonpayment of rent, the lower court must 
first determine whether the tenants were relieved of all or a part 
of their rental obligations as a result of the landlord’s failure to 
repair.72 The reduction in the amount of rent owed, known as a 
rent abatement, is typically described as a percentage of the to-
tal rent owed and is based on the severity of the substandard 
conditions and the length of time for which they persisted.73 The 
court further held that if the defective conditions extinguished 
the tenants’ rental liability, the tenants were entitled to retain 
possession of the apartment.74 
A wave of similar judicial opinions followed. By the late 
1970s, courts in California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New  
Hampshire, New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin, among 
others, had recognized the implied warranty of habitability.75 
Legislatures also acted swiftly.76 By the time New York passed 
its warranty of habitability statute in 1975, the warranty of hab-
itability had already been recognized by legislatures in Rhode 
Island (1970), Arizona (1974), and Delaware (1974).77 The doc-
trine was eventually adopted in some form in every state except 
Arkansas.78 The specific contours of the laws varied, but in its 
most progressive iterations, including in New York, the warranty 
of habitability relieved tenants of all or a part of their rental obli-
gations so long as (1) the landlord had notice of the defective 
 
 71 Javins, 428 F2d at 1082. 
 72 In Javins, the court held specifically that the lower court must determine 
“(1) whether the alleged violations existed during the period for which past due rent is 
claimed, and (2) what portion, if any or all, of the tenant’s obligation to pay rent was 
suspended by the landlord’s breach.” Id at 1082–83 (citations omitted). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of  
Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 Urban L Ann 3, 6–8 
(1979); Green, 517 P2d at 1181; Lund v MacArthur, 462 P2d 482, 483 (Hawaii 1969); 
Lemle v Breeden, 462 P2d 470, 475 (Hawaii 1969). 
 76 Super observes that the simultaneous progression of the implied warranty of 
habitability through courts and legislatures was unusual as compared to other law re-
form initiatives. See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 398–99 (cited in note 19). 
 77 See Cunningham, 16 Urban L Ann at 7 nn 8–11 (cited in note 75). 
 78 Id at 7–8 (listing statutes and cases). 
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conditions, either constructively,79 orally, or in writing from the 
tenant or from a public agency (with no requirement that a 
housing code violation be issued); (2) the defective conditions af-
fected the habitability of the premises; and (3) the landlord had 
failed to make repairs.80 Most jurisdictions also adopted accom-
panying laws protecting tenants from retaliatory eviction when 
they invoked their right to withhold rent as permitted by the 
warranty.81 
While courts and legislatures cited numerous reasons for 
adoption of the warranty of habitability,82 they overwhelmingly 
emphasized that the law would act as a tool for improving the 
rental housing stock occupied by low- and moderate-income fam-
ilies.83 The Javins court noted that the “inequality in bargaining 
power” between landlords and tenants left tenants with “little 
leverage to enforce demands for better housing.”84 Among other 
barriers, tenants were prevented from successfully negotiating 
for improved conditions because “racial and class discrimination 
 
 79 Notice is deemed to be constructive when the landlord knew or should have 
known about the conditions based on interactions with the property. For example, land-
lords are often held to have constructive notice of a condition when the condition existed 
at the time they purchased the property or because the condition exists in plain view and 
the landlord has entered the premises. See, for example, Whitney v Valentin, 963 NYS2d 
109, 110 (NY App 2013). 
 80 In jurisdictions with more progressive forms of the law, tenants also are not re-
quired to deposit withheld rent into court nor to demonstrate “good faith” withholding—
any tenant who has experienced conditions of disrepair during the course of their tenan-
cy can assert breach of the implied warranty of habitability either affirmatively in a suit 
against their landlord or defensively in an eviction action for nonpayment of rent. See, 
for example, NY Real Prop Law § 235-b. The warranty of habitability is also deemed 
nonwaivable. Katheryn M. Dutenhaver, Non-Waiver of the Implied Warranty of Habita-
bility in Residential Leases, 10 Loyola U Chi L J 41, 55 (1978). In at least one jurisdic-
tion, tenants may also assert the claim as a defense to no fault evictions. See Mass Gen 
Laws Ann ch 239, § 8A. In many jurisdictions, courts and legislatures adopted corollary 
laws prohibiting landlords from evicting tenants in retaliation for invoking their rights un-
der the warranty of habitability. See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 411 n 118 (cited in note 19). 
 81 Retaliatory Eviction of Tenant for Reporting Landlord’s Violation of Law, 23 
ALR5th 140 § 2[a] (1994); Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 13 (cited in note 27). 
The warranty of habitability is also generally considered nonwaivable, such that any ef-
fort to contract around it in the lease is void as against public policy. See Dutenhaver,  
10 Loyola U Chi L J at 55 (cited in note 80). 
 82 These reasons included a desire to harmonize landlord-tenant law with broader 
principles of contract and consumer protection law, recognition that the doctrine of  
caveat lessee was ill-fitted with the realities of modern urban living, and a questioning of 
the common law assumption that the land was the most important feature of a lease-
hold. See Javins, 428 F2d at 1077–78. 
 83 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 402 (cited in note 19) (noting that some courts and 
legislatures “saw the implied warranty and its enforceability in actions for nonpayment 
of rent as a means of compelling landlords to maintain their buildings up to minimum 
standards of repair”). 
 84 Javins, 428 F2d at 1079. 
162 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:145 
and standardized form leases . . . [left] tenants in a take it or 
leave it situation.”85 Severe shortages in affordable rental hous-
ing further exacerbated the inequalities in bargaining power, 
which, as the California Supreme Court observed, meant that 
“even when defects are apparent the low income tenant fre-
quently has no realistic alternative but to accept such hous-
ing.”86 Mirroring the views of activists and commentators, courts 
also emphasized that the resource constraints faced by housing 
code enforcement agencies made a private remedy and right of 
action for tenants facing substandard housing conditions all the 
more necessary.87 These concerns were echoed repeatedly 
throughout the country by courts and legislatures as they ush-
ered in one of the most revolutionary changes to landlord-tenant 
law in modern history.88 
C. Developments in Warranty of Habitability Laws 
In recent years, many jurisdictions have narrowed the cir-
cumstances in which the warranty of habitability can be in-
voked. They have done so by adopting three types of limiting 
rules. First, “good faith” laws require tenants to demonstrate 
genuine withholding of rent for bad conditions.89 Under these 
laws, tenants cannot assert the warranty as a defense unless 
they can show that their motive for not paying rent was the 
landlord’s failure to repair.90 The laws effectively excuse land-
lords’ noncompliance with their obligations by removing the  
financial consequences the warranty imposes whenever the fail-
ure to repair coincides with other events that cause the tenant 
 
 85 Id (citations omitted). 
 86 Green, 517 P2d at 1174. See also Karen Tokarz and Zachary Schmook, Law 
School Clinic and Community Legal Services Providers Collaborate to Advance the  
Remedy of Implied Warranty of Habitability in Missouri, 53 Wash U J L & Pol 169, 187 
(2017) (observing that the implied warranty of habitability “developed, in part, as a  
response to a chronic and prolonged housing shortage, particularly for low-income 
households”). 
 87 See Boston Housing Authority v Hemingway, 293 NE2d 831, 839–40 (Mass 1973). 
 88 Although many advocates hoped that the implied warranty of habitability would 
be held constitutionally required, the US Supreme Court rejected this argument. See 
Lindsey v Normet, 405 US 56, 64 (1972). The Court held that federal constitutional prin-
ciples of due process and equal protection do not require that a tenant be allowed to raise 
conditions issues as a defense to a nonpayment of rent eviction. Id at 68–69. 
 89 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 425, 425 n 172 (cited in note 19). Super finds that 
most states have good faith requirements. See id. 
 90 Some commentators defend these laws on the grounds that tenants should not be 
allowed to raise the warranty of habitability as a “legal afterthought.” See, for example, 
Samuel Jan Brakel, URLTA in Operation: The Oregon Experience, 5 Am Bar Found 
Rsrch J 565, 569 (1980). 
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to fall behind in rent. The laws also practically diminish the 
availability of the warranty by increasing the burden of proof; 
some tenants who genuinely intended to withhold rent for defec-
tive conditions may simply have insufficient evidence to make 
out a good faith showing. 
Second, many legislatures and courts have imposed land-
lords’ protective orders, also known as “rent escrow” laws, re-
quiring tenants to deposit unpaid rent with the court as a condi-
tion of asserting the warranty of habitability.91 Some versions of 
rent escrow laws require tenants to deposit their rent at the 
time of the withholding, whereas others impose the requirement 
upon the tenant’s assertion of the warranty defense in the evic-
tion case.92 Most commentators consider rent escrow require-
ments to severely limit the warranty’s effectiveness.93 Many  
tenants are unaware of the requirements and fail to comply with 
them during the appropriate time period. Thus by the time they 
appear in court, they have already effectively waived their right 
 
 91 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 13–14 (cited in note 19). 
Some jurisdictions have mandatory rent escrow requirements, in which all tenants who 
wish to withhold rent must deposit their rent with the court. Id. Other jurisdictions hold 
hearings in which judges make individualized determinations of whether rent escrow 
will be required based on the circumstances of the case. Id. Proponents of landlords’ pro-
tective orders (LPOs) have justified them as necessary to prevent tenants from using the 
implied warranty of habitability in bad faith to shirk valid rental obligations. Id at 13. 
Many scholars, however, criticize LPOs as creating artificial barriers to access the war-
ranty. See, for example, id at 17–18, noting that rent escrow requirements 
put[ ] aggrieved tenants into the untenable position of having to decide whether 
to relocate (a task that is both disruptive and costly), or remain on site, submit to 
judicial proceedings, and be forced to deposit into escrow the full rent due no 
matter the premises’ defective condition, a task that is both onerous and counter-
productive to the goal of improving stocks of decent rental housing. 
See also Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 71–73 (cited in note 28). 
 92 There are also some jurisdictions in which rent escrow orders are available only 
upon motion by the landlord and at the discretion of the judge. See Alaska Stat Ann 
§ 34.03.190(a)(3); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 33-1365(A); Hinson v Delis, 102 Cal Rptr 661, 666 
(Cal App 1972); Javins, 428 F2d at 1083 n 67; Rotheimer v Arana, 892 NE2d 1183, 1194–
95 (Ill App 2008); Iowa Code § 562A.24(1); Kan Stat Ann § 58-2561(a); Ky Rev Stat Ann 
§ 383.645(1); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 239, § 8A; Mont Code Ann § 70-24-421(1); Neb Rev 
Stat § 76-1428(1); Or Rev Stat § 90.370(1)(b); Pugh v Holmes, 405 A2d 897, 907 (Pa 1979); 
RI Gen Laws § 34-18-32(a); Teller v McCoy, 253 SE2d 114, 129–30 (W Va 1978). 
 93 At least one appellate court, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, has found 
that rent escrow requirements that apply to rental arrears (as opposed to applying only 
to ongoing rent that comes due after a case has been commenced) violate due process. 
See Lucky Ned Pepper’s Ltd v Columbia Park and Recreation Association, 494 A2d 947, 
953 (Md Spec App 1985). In Lucky Ned, the court considered a state law that required the 
deposit of all arrears allegedly due as a condition of obtaining a jury trial. Id at 950. The 
court held that the law erroneously presupposed that the rent withheld was in fact owed, 
and therefore improperly interfered with the tenant’s right to a jury trial. Id at 951. 
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to assert the warranty of habitability as a defense.94 Additional-
ly, many tenants are unable to comply with the requirements 
because they are using withheld rent to cope with the disre-
pair.95 Tenants spend money to make repairs on their own, to 
pay for temporary fixes such as space heaters when the heat is 
out or hot plates when the stove is not working, and to replace 
damaged possessions.96 Commentators have pointed out that the 
result of rent escrow laws is often that the tenants who need the 
protections of the warranty of habitability the most become the 
least likely to benefit from it.97 
Third, some jurisdictions have imposed onerous notice re-
quirements for assertion of a warranty claim.98 In their most 
burdensome iterations, these rules require that notice to the 
landlord of defective conditions be established through an offi-
cial housing code violation report.99 Thus, if a tenant calls the 
landlord about the condition of disrepair, talks to the landlord in 
person, or even sends a letter describing the problem and the 
landlord fails to make repairs, the landlord cannot be held lia-
ble. This requirement engrafts the same problems faced by code 
enforcement systems onto the warranty of habitability. Where 
code enforcement agencies are ineffectual and underresourced, a 
warranty of habitability scheme tied to this system will face the 
exact same limitations. Commentators have also remarked that 
such requirements are misaligned with how tenants communi-
cate with their landlords in practice.100 
Multiple factors have motivated the enactment of these re-
strictive doctrines. To some extent, the doctrines reflect underly-
ing hesitation about the establishment of the warranty of habit-
ability.101 In some jurisdictions, legislatures and the public were 
never fully supportive of establishing such an impactful set of 
rights for tenants, and these doctrines were a way of limiting their 
breadth. According to Professor David Super, rent escrow re-
quirements in particular may be a way of “appeas[ing]” landlords 
 
 94 Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 435 (cited in note 19). 
 95 See id at 433 (noting that tenants may be forced to spend their rent money to 
mitigate the damages caused by the landlord’s failure to repair); Franzese, Gorin, and 
Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 36 (cited in note 19) (noting that tenants use withheld rent 
“to make the essential repairs themselves in view of landlord intransigence”). 
 96 An unabated bedbug infestation, for example, will require tenants to buy new 
bedding and furniture. 
 97 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 426 (cited in note 19). 
 98 See id; Myrah v Campbell, 163 P3d 679, 683 (Utah App 2007). 
 99 See, for example, Dugan v Milledge, 494 A2d 1203, 1206 (Conn 1985). 
 100 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 426 (cited in note 19). 
 101 Id at 424. 
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unhappy with the recognition of the warranty.102 He observes that 
where courts have recognized the warranty as a matter of com-
mon rather than statutory law, courts have been vulnerable to 
landlords’ criticism of judicial overreach and therefore are more 
willing to adopt restrictive doctrines.103 Courts and legislatures 
have also enacted the restrictive doctrines as a mechanism to 
protect against perceived tenant abuse of the warranty.104 By 
imposing strict notice requirements, forcing tenants to escrow 
their rent, or requiring a showing of good faith, courts and  
legislatures believe that they are ensuring that only tenants 
who genuinely withhold rent for bad conditions are benefiting 
from the warranty. According to these courts and legislatures, 
tenants who have failed to pay rent for a reason other than de-
fective conditions should not be able to reap financial rewards 
from the establishment of a right to rent abatement if they also 
happen to satisfy the law’s requirements.105 
II.  EXISTING RESEARCH ON THE WARRANTY’S EFFECTIVENESS 
AND THEORIES FOR TENANT UNDERUSE 
Since the warranty of habitability was enacted nearly fifty 
years ago, scholars have tried to understand whether the law 
has lived up to the potential that advocates and proponents orig-
inally envisioned, and if it has not, why not.106 Multiple studies 
 
 102 Id at 428. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 425 (cited in note 19). 
 105 Id. See also Brakel, 5 Am Bar Found Rsrch J at 578 (cited in note 90); 280 Broad, 
LLC v Adams, 2006 WL 2790909, *7 (Conn Super). 
 106 Whether the warranty of habitability actually aids low-income tenants has also 
long been the subject of academic debate. See Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Hous-
ing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income  
Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale L J 1093, 1179–81 (1971); Werner Z. Hirsch, Joel G. 
Hirsch, and Stephen Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws 
upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 Cal L Rev 
1098, 1129–36 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on 
Low Income Housing: “Milking” and Class Violence, 15 Fla St U L Rev 485, 496 (1987); 
Neil K. Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing 
Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 Yale L J 1175, 1192 (1973); Rabin, 69 Cornell L Rev at 
580 (cited in note 18). The “mainstream” view believes that the increased costs imposed by 
code requirements and the warranty of habitability are passed from landlords to tenants, 
thereby hurting tenants (low-income tenants especially) in the long run. See Kennedy, 15 
Fla St U L Rev at 497 (cited in note 106); Rabin, 69 Cornell L Rev at 558–59 (cited in note 
18). However, the overall impact of habitability regulations on housing costs varies wildly 
from study to study. See David Listokin and David B. Hattis, Building Codes and Hous-
ing, 8 Cityscape 21, 21 (2005) (finding that studies on the subject have claimed that build-
ing code regulations increase housing costs anywhere between 1 and 200 percent). Fur-
thermore, some scholars—notably Professor Bruce Ackerman discussing his hypothetical 
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show that tenants rarely assert the warranty as a defense in 
nonpayment of rent eviction cases. Other studies show that very 
few tenants receive rent abatements. These studies, however, 
have limitations. The large-scale studies do not isolate cases of 
tenants with meritorious claims, and thus leave unknown the 
extent to which the outcomes constitute an operationalization 
gap. The only study thus far that has measured outcomes among 
cases with meritorious claims was conducted using a small sam-
ple size that does not purport to be representative. No study has 
yet determined the size of the gap between the number of ten-
ants with meritorious warranty claims and the number who 
benefit from the law. 
Leading scholarship on the warranty of habitability has 
consistently attributed the apparent ineffectiveness of the law to 
two factors: the lack of access to counsel, and onerous substan-
tive doctrines (such as good faith withholding, rent escrow, and 
strict notice requirements that restrict the claim’s use). Yet 
these theories have not been subject to rigorous empirical scru-
tiny. The existing studies show that tenants who are represent-
ed by counsel are more likely to receive rent abatements, but 
these studies have not controlled for whether tenants who are 
represented are more likely to have meritorious claims. The 
scholarship on the substantive doctrines, meanwhile, has been 
largely theoretical in nature. 
This Part provides an overview of the scholarship on the 
warranty of habitability, describing (a) the existing empirical 
studies on the law’s overall usage and effectiveness, (b) the re-
search findings regarding the impact of legal counsel, and 
(c) current explanations for the law’s apparent ineffectiveness. 
A. Use and Effectiveness of the Warranty of Habitability 
Marilyn Mosier and Richard Soble pioneered the empirical 
scholarship on the warranty of habitability in the early 1970s 
with a study of the Detroit landlord-tenant court in the years 
immediately following Michigan’s enactment of the law.107 
Through case file review and in-court observations, Mosier and 
Soble found that rent abatements were awarded in an extremely 
small percentage of the total number of nonpayment of rent 
 
town of “Slumville”—have argued that code enforcement and the warranty of habitability 
will help tenants without increasing their rents. See Ackerman, 80 Yale L J at 1177–86 
(cited in note 106); Kennedy, 15 Fla St U L Rev at 499 (cited in note 106). 
 107 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 33 (cited in note 27). 
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eviction cases.108 Specifically, they found that at most, rent 
abatements were awarded in 2 percent of all nonpayment of rent 
cases.109 Shortly after Mosier and Soble’s research was pub-
lished, a team of Illinois-based researchers conducted a similar 
study of Chicago’s eviction court and found that zero tenants in 
the sample of cases they studied received rent abatements, even 
though 41 percent of tenants had raised the warranty of habita-
bility as a defense.110 
Two more recent studies produced findings similar to those in 
Mosier and Soble’s research. The first study was an observation-
based study conducted by Professor Barbara Bezdek of a sample 
of nonpayment of rent eviction cases in Baltimore in the early 
1990s.111 Bezdek found that rent abatements were ordered in on-
ly 1.75 percent of all cases she observed.112 The second study re-
viewed court records of all nonpayment of rent eviction cases in 
Essex County, New Jersey, in 2014.113 The authors, Professor 
Paula Franzese, Abbott Gorin, and David Guzik, calculated the 
overall frequency with which tenants formally raised the war-
ranty as a defense.114 They found that the warranty was asserted 
in the tenant’s answer in only 0.2 percent of all cases (80 out of 
40,000).115 Based on these findings, Franzese and her colleagues 
concluded that the warranty was significantly underutilized.116 
 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. The study found that the full rent claim was excused in 0.7 percent of 
contested nonpayment cases or 0.1 percent of all nonpayment cases, and it was partially 
excused in 11.9 percent of contested nonpayment cases or 2 percent of all nonpayment 
cases. However, these figures include cases in which the landlord received less than the 
full amount of rent claimed for reasons other than a rent abatement in satisfaction of the 
tenant’s implied warranty of habitability claim, including when the rent claimed had 
been miscalculated and when the tenant had made all or partial payment. See id. 
 110 Fusco, Collins, and Birnbaum, 17 Urban L Ann at 109 (cited in note 27). One ad-
ditional study conducted during the same time period produced similar findings. See Ben 
H. Logan III and John J. Sabl, Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of 
Habitability in Practice, 28 Stan L Rev 729, 744 (1976) (“During the period examined, the 
implied warranty of habitability was pled as an affirmative defense in 56 cases constitut-
ing 4 percent of all unlawful detainer actions and representing 27 percent of all contested 
unlawful detainer actions filed in that court for the 5-month period in question.”). 
 111 It is unclear whether this sample is a statistically significant representative 
sample. See Bezdek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 547 n 52 (cited in note 27). The study also in-
volved court record review and exit interviews with litigants. Id at 547–48 n 53–54. 
 112 See id at 554. Rent was ordered into escrow in 4.3 percent of all cases. 
 113 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 20 (cited in note 19). 
 114 Id at 21. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id at 22. This conclusion is based on the “far greater statistical likelihood that 
significant housing code violations exist on leased premises in Essex County.” Id. The 
authors do not state specifically what the statistical likelihood is that substandard  
conditions exist in the premises. See id. They cite only to HUD data on the prevalence of 
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These four studies measured the frequency with which the 
warranty of habitability was asserted or won (in the form of a 
rent abatement) within the total population of nonpayment of 
rent cases. None measured this frequency against the population 
of cases with meritorious warranty claims. Thus, the studies’ 
conclusions that the warranty is ineffective rest on the assump-
tion that more tenants could have asserted or won the claim than 
actually did so. It is unknown whether that assumption was  
valid. Moreover, even if it was valid, the findings tell us little 
about the size of the gap between the number of tenants with 
meritorious claims and the number who benefited from the law. 
The only study thus far that has sought to determine a ten-
ant’s likelihood of benefiting from the warranty of habitability 
when he or she has a meritorious claim is Professor Michele  
Cotton’s “multi-case study” of fifty-nine rent escrow actions in 
Baltimore.117 In these actions, tenants petition the court to have 
their rent deposited into the court’s escrow account rather than 
paid to the landlord based on violations of the warranty of hab-
itability.118 Cotton found that less than half—42 percent—of ten-
ants who had established entitlement to a rent abatement actu-
ally received one.119 However, Cotton’s study was based on a 
small sample of cases that did not claim to be statistically repre-
sentative of the population as a whole;120 thus, the conclusions 
that may be drawn from the findings are limited. 
These studies leave two significant gaps in our knowledge 
about the use and effectiveness of the warranty of habitability. 
First, no large-scale study has yet compared the number of cases 
in which tenants benefit from the warranty against the number 
of cases in which tenants have meritorious claims.121 Thus, we do 
 
substandard housing conditions nationwide. Id at 5 n 11. One year later, in 2017,  
Professors Karen Tokarz and Zachary Schmook published the results of a study that 
looked broadly at outcomes in eviction cases in St. Louis, Missouri. See Tokarz and 
Schmook, 53 Wash U J L & Pol at 176–78 (cited in note 86). While the study did not look 
specifically at the frequency with which the warranty of habitability was raised, it found 
that only 0.03 percent of cases resulted in judgments for the tenant whereas 77.5 percent 
of cases resulted in judgments for the landlord (with the remainder of cases resulting in 
dismissal). Id at 176. Based on these findings, the authors concluded that the warranty 
of habitability is rarely used. Id at 186–87. 
 117 See Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 62–63 (cited in note 28). 
 118 Id at 63. 
 119 Id at 72. Specifically, tenants received abatements in 42 percent of cases in 
which they had established the elements required for this relief. Id.  
 120 Id at 62–64 (cited in note 28). 
 121 See Steinberg, 42 L & Soc Inquiry at 1072 (cited in note 22), noting that  
[e]ven when a study demonstrates that one class of litigants—tenants, for ex-
ample—routinely achieves unfavorable outcomes, it can be difficult to ascertain 
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not know the extent to which the low usage rates reflect the 
law’s ineffectiveness, or simply reflect low rates at which ten-
ants have meritorious claims. No one has yet determined the 
size of the operationalization gap. Second, the existing studies 
leave open the possibility that tenants may benefit from the 
warranty of habitability through outcomes other than rent 
abatements.122 Tenants who settle their cases may elect to lever-
age their right to a rent abatement to negotiate a longer repay-
ment period or avoid a possessory judgment in favor of the land-
lord. No studies have accounted for this possibility. Without 
research that fills these gaps, we cannot properly reach a  
conclusion about the extent to which tenants benefit from the 
warranty of habitability. 
B. Impact of Legal Representation 
Very limited research exists on the impact of legal represen-
tation on the use of the implied warranty of habitability. Mosier 
and Soble’s study of the Detroit landlord-tenant court found that 
tenants who were represented by counsel were more likely than 
unrepresented tenants to raise the warranty as a defense.123 
They also found that represented tenants achieved overall better 
outcomes in their cases as compared to unrepresented tenants.124 
However, this study did not identify the extent to which the rep-
resented tenants were more likely to have warranty of habitabil-
ity claims. It is possible, in other words, that lawyers chose ten-
ants for representation because they had meritorious claims, 
and thus that the higher usage of the claim and stronger out-
comes simply reflect this selection bias. 
The only other research that exists on the effect of counsel 
has been embedded within two studies on the overall impact of 
access to counsel in eviction cases.125 The first, a 1992 study on 
 
whether the poor outcomes are the result of unmeritorious claims, or are due to 
more problematic factors, such as lack of representation or structural unfairness 
within the adjudicatory process. 
 122 The only exception is Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik’s research on the use of the 
warranty of habitability as a tool to compel landlords to make needed repairs. See 
Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 24–25, 30–31 (cited in note 19). 
 123 Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 45 (cited in note 27). 
 124 Id at 35. Anthony Fusco, Nancy Collins, and Julian Birnbaum’s study also found 
that tenants who were represented by counsel achieved significantly better outcomes 
than unrepresented tenants. See Fusco, Collins, and Birnbaum, 17 Urban L Ann at 115 
(cited in note 27). 
 125 In addition, Professor Jessica Steinberg’s study of the impact of unbundled legal 
aid found that tenants who were provided with unbundled legal services were signifi-
cantly more likely to raise cognizable defenses as compared with unassisted tenants. See 
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the impact of counsel in eviction cases in New York City, found 
that rent abatements were awarded in 18.8 percent of cases in 
which the tenant was represented by counsel, compared with  
only 3.3 percent of cases in which the tenant was unrepresent-
ed.126 Tenants were randomly assigned to the treatment (offer of 
representation) and control (no offer of representation) groups to 
eliminate selection bias.127 However, there was no specific con-
trol for whether the tenants in each group had meritorious war-
ranty of habitability claims at the same rate. 
The second study, a more recent assessment of the impact of 
access to counsel in eviction cases in Massachusetts, found that 
monetary outcomes were significantly more favorable to the 
tenant where the tenant was represented.128 These monetary 
outcomes reflected rent abatements resulting from the warranty 
of habitability, but also could reflect monetary damages award-
ed based on other claims129 or reductions in the rent owed due to 
miscalculations or partial payment by the tenant.130 Like in the 
1992 study, it was also unknown whether the treated (offer of 
representation) and control (no offer of legal representation) 
groups had meritorious warranty of habitability claims at the 
same rate. No research has rigorously assessed the impact of 
counsel on the use of the warranty of habitability while control-
ling for whether the tenant had a meritorious claim. 
 
Steinberg, 18 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 494 (cited in note 31). The study did not 
isolate breach of warranty claims specifically. See id. Steinberg also found that full rep-
resentation had a significant impact on the likelihood of the tenant receiving payments 
from the landlord at the conclusion of the case, while unbundled legal assistance had no 
positive effect on the tenant’s likelihood of receiving a payment from the landlord. See id 
at 486. The study did not determine whether the payment reflected a rent abatement 
based on the landlord’s violation of warranty of habitability or alternatively was based 
on some other monetary claim. Id at 486–88. 
 126 Seron, Frankel, and Van Ryzin, 35 L & Soc Rev at 426 (cited in note 31). 
 127 All cases included in the study population had been determined as cases in which 
the tenant was likely to benefit from legal support. See id at 423–24. This assessment 
was based on the presence of defenses and claims (beyond only the warranty of habitabil-
ity), as well as nonlegal characteristics of the tenant and case. Id. 
 128 Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennessy, 126 Harv L Rev at 931 (cited in note 31). 
 129 Under Massachusetts law, there are numerous counterclaims available to ten-
ants in nonpayment of rent eviction cases which carry monetary damages. See, for ex-
ample, Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 93A, §§ 2, 9; Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 186, § 14 (lessor’s 
obligation to furnish utilities); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 186, § 18 (lessor’s obligation to 
correct unsafe conditions upon notice); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 186, § 15B (prohibition 
against lessor on entering premises during lease term). 
 130 See Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennessy, 126 Harv L Rev at 931 (cited in note 31). 
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C. Explanations for the Law’s Ineffectiveness 
There is a general consensus among scholars who have 
studied the warranty of habitability that the law’s ineffective-
ness is attributable to two main factors. First, scholars claim 
that the ineffectiveness is a function of tenants’ lack of access to 
counsel.131 Nearly all tenants in eviction proceedings are unrep-
resented; in some jurisdictions, as many as 94 percent of tenants 
appear in court without counsel.132 Pointing to the research de-
scribed in Part II.B, commentators argue that the overall lack of 
access to counsel is responsible for the claim’s underuse.133 They 
posit that unrepresented tenants do not have the knowledge, 
 
 131 See, for example, Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 62 (cited in note 27) 
(“Another reason for the insignificant effect of the legislation on Detroit tenants is that 
while the legislation augments a tenant’s possible defenses, it does not provide for repre-
sentation of those tenants in court.”); Fusco, Collins, and Birnbaum, 17 Urban L Ann at 
114–16 (cited in note 27) (emphasizing the importance of representation in determining 
tenant outcomes); Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 31 (cited in note 19) 
(proposing increased access to counsel as a solution to improve the effectiveness of the 
warranty of habitability); Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 83–84 (cited in note 28) (citing lack 
of access to counsel as a barrier to effective assertion of the warranty of habitability). 
 132 See, for example, Boston Bar Association Task Force on the Civil Right to Coun-
sel, The Importance of Representation in Eviction Cases and Homelessness Prevention *3 
(Mar 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/PWL2-SWAW (determining that only 6 to 
10 percent of tenants in Massachusetts are represented); Russell Engler, Connecting 
Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is 
Most Needed, 37 Fordham Urban L J 37, 47 n 44 (2010) (citing representation rates in 
multiple jurisdictions); Maya Dukmasova, New Data Reveals Impact of Being Lawyerless 
in Chicago Eviction Court (The Chicago Reader, Sept 14, 2017), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/M83U-V5XE (stating that only 12 percent of tenants in Cook County are repre-
sented); Charles Allen, Kenyan R. McDuffie, and Mary M. Cheh, Low-Income Tenants in 
D.C. May Soon Get Legal Help (Wash Post, May 18, 2017), online at https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2017/05/18/low-income-tenants 
-in-d-c-may-soon-get-legal-help (visited November 20, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(stating that fewer than 10 percent of tenants in DC are represented). In New York City, 
where a right to counsel law was recently enacted, the percentage of tenants represented 
has risen from 1 percent before 2014 to 30 percent in in the final quarter of 2018. NYC 
Human Resources Administration, Office of Civil Justice, Universal Access to Legal  
Services: A Report on Year One of Implementation in New York City *4 (2018), archived 
at https://perma.cc/43MV-H2DL. 
 133 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 13 (cited in note 19). But see 
Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 84 (cited in note 28) (noting that “[t]he lack of counsel means 
that the parties are particularly dependent on the court to ensure that the rule of law is 
applied”); id at 86–87 (arguing that advocates hoping to improve utilization of the implied 
warranty of habitability should not focus their efforts on access to counsel because the 
data suggest that all efforts thus far have faltered, and moreover the provision of addi-
tional lawyers would impose considerable resource demands on the courts); Bezdek, 20 
Hofstra L Rev at 538 n 16 (cited in note 27) (arguing against solutions involving access to 
counsel because it is “parentalistic [sic] and it lets us off the hook for our parts in the  
charade of legal entitlement and rights vindication”). 
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wherewithal, or resources required to effectively navigate the le-
gal process in order to benefit from the warranty of habitability.134 
Second, commentators argue that restrictive substantive 
doctrines, namely rent escrow, good faith withholding, and oner-
ous notice requirements, limit the claim’s usage.135 These  
doctrines are not universal, but are becoming increasingly com-
mon across jurisdictions.136 Professor Super, a leading scholar on 
the warranty of habitability, attributes the “fall” of the warranty 
of habitability primarily to the spread of these rules.137 Writing 
in the California Law Review in 2011, Super finds that these  
“procedural obstacles have rendered the implied warranty of 
habitability almost irrelevant in practice.”138 He argues that the 
requirements are costly for tenants to comply with, are vulnera-
ble to landlord abuse, and encourage tenants to move rather 
than pursue their claims.139 While he acknowledges that data on 
their impacts is lacking, he contends that these substantive lim-
itations “likely are a significant contributor to the low rate of re-
lief granted [for violations of the warranty of habitability] to 
low-income tenants.”140 Franzese has likewise blamed these 
rules for the ineffectiveness of the warranty, describing them as 
a “practical bar to aggrieved tenants’ very assertion of the de-
fense of breach of the warranty.”141 
 
 134 See Bezdek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 538 (cited in note 27); Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 406–
07 (cited in note 19); Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 66 (cited in note 28) (arguing that the le-
galese on pleadings acts as a barrier to unrepresented tenants asserting the warranty). 
 135 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 407 (cited in note 19) (drawing attention to the “little-
appreciated substantive doctrines” that emerged after the law’s original enactment and 
arguing that they have operated as major barriers to the warranty’s effectiveness); 
Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 20–22 (cited in note 19) (arguing that 
New Jersey’s rent escrow requirement is one of the primary reasons for their findings 
regarding the low frequency with which the warranty is raised). On paper, the rent es-
crow requirement in New Jersey gives trial courts the discretion to order rent be paid 
into escrow during the pendency of the eviction case. Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik found 
that in practice, however, judges treat escrow hearings with little individualized atten-
tion, and as a matter of course order rent be deposited with the court, regardless of the 
conditions of the premises. Id at 19–20, 37. The authors acknowledge that they do not 
know whether their findings regarding the presence of the rent escrow requirement and 
the low usage rates are correlative or causative. Id at 20. See also Tokarz and Schmook, 
53 Wash U J L & Pol at 178 (cited in note 86). 
 136 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 425–29 (cited in note 19). 
 137 Id at 423–26. 
 138 Id at 423. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 432 (cited in note 19). 
 141 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 36 (cited in note 19). 
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Scholars have also put forward other explanations for the 
law’s apparent ineffectiveness.142 Super argues that tenants fac-
tor fears of retaliation into the “costs” of litigation; thus, to the 
extent tenants anticipate landlord retaliation, they will be un-
likely to assert their rights under the law.143 Most recently, 
Franzese argued that the lack of centralized and accessible 
housing code record databases prevents judges from effectively 
enforcing the warranty.144 Franzese posited that the availability 
of code enforcement data through such a database would both 
inform the court’s analysis of the law and “would be a tool for 
[the] government to reduce or withhold any rent subsidies until 
the premises are restored to an inhabitable condition.”145 She 
explicitly pointed to New York City’s centralized code violation 
database as a model for other jurisdictions to follow.146 
 
 142 Since the warranty’s initial enactment, scholars have emphasized that en-
trenched power differentials between landlords and tenants, along with court cultures 
that privilege landlords and stigmatize tenant litigants, act as significant barriers to the 
law’s effectiveness. See Bedzek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 571–72, 568 (cited in note 27)  
(observing that in Baltimore, “the formal allocation of responsibilities between landlord 
and tenant is effectively overwritten by the ‘tenant as deadbeat’ subtext which is reiter-
ated by the court on behalf of the class of landlord litigants,” and arguing that “[i]n a ju-
risdiction with a functioning warranty of habitability, the subtext in tenant-claiming 
cases would be: it is the landlord who has done wrong by failing to fulfill societally rec-
ognized obligations”); Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 85 (cited in note 28) (“It may also be the 
case that any uncertainty about the law that results in an environment of limited appel-
late guidance will be resolved against the less powerful party in the litigation, which in 
this situation is the tenant.”); Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 451 (cited in note 19) (“[E]ither 
abandoning or destabilizing courthouse culture could have resulted in much broader ap-
plication of the implied warranty.”); Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 63 (cited in 
note 27): 
The disparities in help given to landlords and tenants and the treatment of 
late landlords and tenants are an indication of the perhaps inevitable bias of 
the court toward the landlord. Most of the judges and court personnel have a 
middle-class background, and they have become familiar with many landlords 
and attorneys appearing regularly in the court. The court had years of experi-
ence as a vehicle for rent collection and eviction where no defenses could be 
raised. 
Scholars have also highlighted the constraints that judges face in enforcing the laws. 
Judges have large numbers of cases on their dockets and lack access to important fact-
finding tools and resources. See Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 85–86 (cited in note 28). 
 143 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 408 (cited in note 19). 
 144 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 22 (cited in note 19). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id at 36, 27 n 106 (noting that New York City has a Housing Code violation da-
tabase that is publicly available online and that the Housing Court provides a computer 
on each judge’s bench). An even more robust technology solution was urged by Professor 
Mary Marsh Zulack nearly a decade prior. See Mary Marsh Zulack, If You Prompt Them, 
They Will Rule: The Warranty of Habitability Meets New Court Information Systems, 40 
John Marshall L Rev 425, 449–53 (2007). Specifically, Zulack proposed a computerized 
system that would “prompt judges through repair-related information gathering,  
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III.  STUDY BACKGROUND AND DESIGN 
This study sought to use rigorous methodological analysis to 
assess the extent to which tenants who have meritorious war-
ranty of habitability claims received benefits from the claim.147 It 
also sought to rigorously evaluate the existing theories regard-
ing the apparent ineffectiveness of the law, including the extent 
to which legal representation affects tenants’ likelihood of re-
ceiving the law’s benefits. New York City was chosen as the site 
for this study because, in addition to being the nation’s largest 
rental market, it is located in a jurisdiction that lacks the sub-
stantive doctrines often blamed for the law’s failures. This legal 
backdrop is ideal because it allows for disentanglement of the 
various contributors to the claim’s underuse. This Part describes 
the study’s objectives, context, data, and methodology. 
A. Objectives 
The overarching objectives of this study were twofold. First, 
the study aimed to properly assess the effectiveness of the war-
ranty of habitability through rigorous methods and statistical 
analysis. While prior large-scale studies measured the overall 
frequency with which tenants asserted the warranty of habita-
bility as a claim or received rent abatements in nonpayment of 
rent eviction cases, this study measured what I call the “opera-
tionalization gap”—the difference between the number of cases 
in which the tenant has a meritorious warranty of habitability 
claim and the number of cases in which the tenant receives some 
benefit from that claim.148 It did so by identifying the cases in 
which the tenant appears to have a meritorious claim based on 
evidence of defective conditions in the unit.149 Moreover, while 
 
retrieval, and adjudication steps.” Id at 425. Zulack predicted that such a system would 
“lead[ ] efficiently to outcomes that link the application of the warranty of habitability 
doctrine to real world improvements in rental premises.” Id. 
 147 New York City is also the nation’s largest rental market and one notorious for 
substandard housing conditions. See note 21; Grace Ashford, Leaks, Mold and Rats: Why 
New York City Goes Easy on Its Worst Landlords (NY Times, Dec 26, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/WVS7-6URQ. 
 148 The objective here is not to determine whether the outcome was “just,” but 
whether tenants who appeared to have meritorious claims received the benefits the law 
affords for those claims. See Paula Hannaford-Agor and Nicole Mott, Research on Self-
Represented Litigation: Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 Just 
Sys J 163, 178 (2003) (noting that “whether the litigant received a just or appropriate 
outcome” is “one of the most difficult questions for which to formulate accurate and  
reliable measures for empirical analysis”). 
 149 The data in this study showed that proper assertion of the warranty of habitabil-
ity as a claim in the tenant’s answer was largely insignificant as a factor predicting 
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prior studies have focused nearly exclusively on tenants’ use of 
the warranty of habitability to achieve rent abatements, this 
study also considered the possible use of the law to achieve other 
beneficial case outcomes or to secure repairs. 
Second, the study set out to rigorously evaluate the existing 
theories regarding the warranty of habitability’s ineffectiveness. 
As described previously,150 scholarship has consistently attribut-
ed the doctrine’s apparent failures to two factors: lack of access 
to counsel and restrictive substantive doctrines. The scholar-
ship, however, has been largely theoretical in nature; no studies 
have yet subjected these factors to rigorous empirical scrutiny.151 
This is the first study to do so. To understand the impact of 
counsel, I compared outcomes of cases with meritorious claims 
where tenants were and were not represented. To understand 
the significance of the restrictive substantive doctrines, I as-
sessed the extent to which tenants benefited from the warranty 
of habitability in a jurisdiction (New York City) in which these 
doctrines are absent. While this assessment does not allow for a 
precise determination of the impact of the doctrines, it indicates 
the extent to which we can properly attribute the warranty of 
habitability’s ineffectiveness to them. In other words, the exist-
ing literature would predict that in jurisdictions where the re-
strictive doctrines do not exist, the warranty of habitability 
would be widely used. I assess whether this prediction is  
accurate. I also used the available data to glean insights into the 
extent to which an accessible and centralized Housing Code  





whether the claim was used successfully. Approximately half of the tenants who received 
rent abatements never actually asserted the claim. This finding is consistent with what 
one would expect given liberal pleading amendment rules. These rules have the effect of 
making actual amendments unnecessary in proceedings that usually resolve in relatively 
expeditious out-of-court settlements, such as eviction proceedings, where it is understood 
that the party could receive the amendment if leave was sought, and thus to avoid un-
necessary litigation the parties treat the pleadings as if they were amended without ac-
tually going through the judicial procedures to do so. 
 150 See Part II.C. 
 151 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 20–22 (cited in note 19) 
(citing to New Jersey’s rent escrow requirement as one of the primary reasons for their 
findings regarding the infrequency with which the warranty is raised); Super, 99 Cal L 
Rev at 432 (cited in note 19) (concluding that rent escrow laws “likely are a significant 
contributor to the low rate of relief granted [for breach of the warranty of habitability] to 
low-income tenants”); id at 441 (arguing that good faith requirements may make tenants 
incapable of pursuing warranty of habitability claims). 
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These objectives translated into four specific research ques-
tions that drove the analysis of the quantitative data: 
(1) How often do tenants with meritorious warranty of 
habitability claims receive rent abatements? 
(2) To what extent do tenants with meritorious warranty of 
habitability claims receive other benefits as a result of 
the claim, such as a longer time period to pay rental 
arrears or the avoidance of a possessory judgment?152 
(3) To what extent is the warranty of habitability serving as 
an effective tool to hold landlords accountable for 
making necessary repairs? 
(4) To the extent it exists, is the warranty of habitability’s 
operationalization gap primarily a function of the lack of 
legal representation? 
B. Study Context 
New York City was an optimal site for this study for multi-
ple reasons. For one, New York’s warranty of habitability laws 
lack the restrictive rules that previous scholarship has blamed 
for the law’s ineffectiveness. Specifically, tenants are not re-
quired to deposit their unpaid rent into escrow, nor are they re-
quired to demonstrate that the reason for the nonpayment was 
withholding of rent for defective conditions.153 Notice require-
ments are also liberal: tenants are never required to provide  
notice in writing, let alone through the Code enforcement  
agency.154 New York City also has a centralized and publicly ac-
cessible Housing Code record database that judges can easily 
reference, which Professor Franzese predicts would aid in the 
law’s enforcement.155 Analysis of the effectiveness of the warran-
ty in this context provides crucial insight into whether the bar-
riers traditionally cited to are in fact the primary culprits for the 
law’s apparent ineffectiveness, or whether there are other,  
 
 152 For a detailed description of the meaning and significance of a possessory  
judgment, see note 23. 
 153 See NY Real Prop Law § 235-b. 
 154 See Chapman v Silber, 760 NE2d 329, 334 (NY 2001) (stating that notice is ade-
quate if the landlord “reserves the right to enter in order to inspect or to make [ ]  
repairs”). 
 155 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 19, 22, 36, 38 (cited in note 19). 
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perhaps less well-understood factors contributing to the out-
comes commentators have observed. Additionally, the data 
available in New York City allow for an assessment of the im-
pact of counsel while controlling for the strength of the tenant’s 
warranty of habitability claim. This assessment more accurately 
indicates the impact of legal representation on the use of the 
claim than any of the studies conducted previously. 
A brief overview of New York’s warranty of habitability laws 
and eviction procedures is necessary to contextualize the study 
design and results. New York enacted the warranty of habitabil-
ity through legislation in 1975.156 The statute, New York Real 
Property Law § 235-b, provides that all residential leases, 
whether written or oral, contain an implied covenant that the 
premises be “fit for human habitation,” and that the tenants 
“shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be danger-
ous, hazardous or detrimental to their life, health or safety.”157 
As in most jurisdictions, it further provides that any attempt to 
waive these obligations is void as contrary to public policy, and 
that no expert testimony is needed to establish damages.158 A 
landlord must have had actual or constructive notice of the con-
ditions in order for a tenant to recover for breach of the warran-
ty. Written notice can never be required, however, regardless of 
 
 156 See NY Real Prop Law § 235-b. This legislation followed a New York Appellate 
Division case, Tonetti v Penati, 367 NYS2d 804 (NY App 1975), which laid the initial 
groundwork for a warranty of habitability in New York. In Tonetti, a tenant argued that 
he should be entitled to the return of his security deposit—even though he left an 
apartment many months before the expiration of his lease—due to the overpowering 
stench of dog urine. Id at 805. The Appellate Division agreed. The Tonetti court held, “It 
is evident that the rationale behind the common-law rule, which likened a lease to the 
sale of a chattel and therefore applied the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, has no ra-
tional basis in a modern, urban society.” Id at 807. Senate Bill 3331B, which passed and 
later became codified as New York’s Real Property Law § 235-b, represented a direct re-
sponse to the case. See Kaplan v Coulston, 381 NYS2d 634, 635 (NY City Civ 1976).  
 157 NY Real Prop Law § 235-b(1). This provision has been interpreted to impose re-
pair obligations on landlords where premises are not “fit for their intended purposes,” 
and tenants have been “subjected to conditions which are dangerous to their life, health, 
and safety.” See K.E.V. Realty Co, Inc v Kelly, NY L J 26, 27 (NY City Civ May 31, 1996). 
 158 See NY Real Prop Law § 235-b(2), (3)(a). Section 235-b(3)(b) provides that if the 
failure to repair is caused due to a labor strike, and the landlord has made a good-faith 
effort to cure the conditions, then the tenant cannot recover damages. Section 235-b(3)(c) 
is designed to avoid double recovery for tenants in already-protected housing. Specifical-
ly, this section limits the recovery of tenants in housing subject to rent stabilization, rent 
control, the “emergency tenant protection act of nineteen seventy-four [1974],” or “the 
city rent and rehabilitation law.” NY Real Prop Law § 235-b(3)(c). The section states that 
if a tenant living in one of these types of housing receives a rent reduction from the New 
York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), then the amount a 
tenant recovers due to a landlord’s breach of the warranty of habitability must be re-
duced by the amount of this rent reduction. NY Real Prop Law § 235-b(3)(c). 
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what is provided in the lease.159 As stated previously, New York 
has no rent escrow or good faith requirements for the assertion 
of the warranty of habitability.160 While the warranty can be as-
serted affirmatively, most tenants assert the claim as a defense 
and/or counterclaim once a nonpayment of rent case is com-
menced against them.161 
In recent years, approximately 200,000 nonpayment of rent 
eviction cases have been filed annually in New York City Hous-
ing Court.162 Consistent with the eviction case resolution  
processes nationwide, the overwhelming majority of such cases 
are resolved through settlement agreements.163 Nearly all  
settlements take the form of repayment agreements in which 
the tenant agrees to pay the rental arrears owed within a stated 
period of time.164 There are three key outcomes negotiated in a 
repayment agreement. First, the parties negotiate the amount of 
 
 159 Kaplan, 381 NYS2d at 635. 
 160 Ocean Rock Associates v Cruz, 411 NYS2d 663, 663 (NY App 1978). The tenant 
must allow the landlord to enter the premises to make repairs; a tenant’s refusal to allow 
access provides a defense for landlords to damages for breach of the warranty of habita-
bility. Fifty-Seven Associates, LP v Feinman, 2011 WL 749255, *1 (NY Sup). However, a 
landlord cannot merely assert a good faith defense by attempting (and failing) to cure: 
because the warranty of habitability reflects a contractual obligation, courts interpret 
the breach strictly. Joseph v Varna Trust, NY L J 32 (NY City Civ Feb 13, 2003). 
 161 Tenants in New York City generally do not bring affirmative warranty of habita-
bility claims where they face conditions of disrepair; they instead bring Housing Part 
(HP) actions. See Dennis E. Milton, Comment, The New York City Housing Part: New 
Remedy for an Old Dilemma, 3 Fordham Urban L J 267, 270 (1975). A designated section 
of the Housing Court adjudicates HP actions. Any time a landlord violates or appears to 
have violated New York City’s Housing Maintenance Code or the New York City Civil 
Court Act, a tenant can initiate an HP action. Id. 
 162 See NYC Human Resources Administration, NYC Office of Civil Justice 2017 
Annual Report and Strategic Plan *19, archived at https://perma.cc/CYR4-A3MD. In 
2016, the year this study was conducted, there were 202,300 nonpayment cases filed. 
The number of nonpayment cases filed has steadily decreased since 2013. Eviction cases 
brought for reasons other than nonpayment of rent, such as termination of the tenancy 
or violation of the lease, are considered “holdover[s].” In 2016, there were 31,584  
holdover cases filed. A total of 22,089 eviction cases resulted in actual eviction that year, 
but the percentage breakdown between holdovers and nonpayment cases is unknown. 
See id at *19–20. 
 163 In this study, less than 1 percent of nonpayment of rent evictions went to trial. For a 
discussion of the widespread practice across jurisdictions of resolving eviction cases through 
“hallway negotiations,” see Engler, 37 Fordham Urban L J at 47 (cited in note 132). 
 164 The data in this study showed that 22 percent of all nonpayment cases in which 
the tenant appeared were resolved through a settlement agreement in which the land-
lord agreed to discontinue the case (presumably because all the arrears had been paid or 
otherwise accounted for). One percent of cases resulted in settlement agreements in 
which the tenant agreed to move out, 0.5 percent resulted in dismissal (presumably be-
cause of a procedural or other type of defect), and 8 percent resulted in a default judg-
ment. Cases that resulted in a discontinuance, move out agreement, or default judgment 
were excluded from the analysis unless otherwise indicated. 
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money that must be repaid. Any rent abatement granted to the 
tenant will be incorporated into this amount.165 Where a rent 
abatement is granted, the agreement will reference the abate-
ment explicitly.166 Second, the parties negotiate the length of 
time for repayment. If the tenant repays the amount owed by 
the deadline, the tenancy will be reinstated. Third, the parties 
negotiate whether the agreement will include a judgment for  
the landlord.167 What occurs if the tenant misses a payment  
under the agreement depends on whether the agreement con-
tained a judgment for the landlord. If the agreement includes a 
 
 165 The size of a rent abatement is measured by the diminution of value of the prem-
ises, in other words, by calculating the difference between the value of the premises in 
good repair and the value of the premises in their defective condition. This difference is 
then multiplied by the length of time for which the defective conditions existed, from the 
time of notice to the landlord to the time of repair. Rent abatements may also be award-
ed at an abatement hearing held by a judge prior to the full trial. Because very few cases 
go to trial, few abatement hearings are held. All abatements awarded after a hearing 
were included in the data coding, analysis, and results. The amount of arrears claimed 
by the landlord may also be reduced for other reasons such as improper rental over-
charges, the attribution of arrears to a public housing authority responsible for making 
Section 8 payments, or for other monetary claims asserted by the tenant. 
 166 The rent abatement and its purpose (to satisfy the tenant’s warranty of habita-
bility claims) are almost always expressly stated because landlords want to ensure that 
tenants cannot seek to recover on the claims again in a subsequent settlement agree-
ment in the same case, or in a separate court proceeding. To check for the possibility that 
settlement agreements included “hidden” abatements, I also coded for two settlement 
outcomes that could be equivalent to a rent abatement: a promise to pay rental arrears 
in an amount of $7,000, $9,000, or $11,000, and agreements that prospectively set the 
rent. In 2016, $7,000 $9,000, and $11,000 were the maximum arrears amounts that City 
voucher programs (respectively) would pay when granting a tenant a new voucher. A 
tenant who is facing eviction for nonpayment of rent and cannot afford the rent going 
forward may apply for and receive the voucher if the amount of rent he or she owes is no 
greater than the particular amount ($7,000, $9,000, or $11,000, depending on the pro-
gram). When the City grants the voucher, it will also pay off those arrears. The possibil-
ity thus exists that instead of granting a rent abatement explicitly, a landlord may satis-
fy the tenant’s warranty claims by agreeing to reduce the total arrears to either $7,000, 
$9,000, or $11,000 so that the tenant can qualify for the voucher. Similarly, a landlord 
may satisfy the tenant’s claims by agreeing to a future rent amount that is lower than 
the legal rent (known as a “preferential rent”) or the rent he or she would otherwise 
charge (if unregulated), rather than expressly granting an abatement. However, the cod-
ing revealed that both of these outcomes were extremely rare—they existed in the cases 
of less than 1 percent of tenants with meritorious warranty claims. Because the out-
comes were so rare and it remains ambiguous whether they even truly reflect a rent 
abatement awarded for the tenant’s warranty of habitability claims—landlords could 
have other reasons for wanting their tenants accepted into the voucher program or for 
setting a prospective rent in the settlement agreement—I did not count these cases as 
having rent abatements for the purpose of the data analysis. 
 167 It is generally understood that these latter two outcomes—amount of time to pay 
and whether a judgment issues—operate in an inverse relationship in negotiations. 
Thus, the landlord will agree to a stipulation without a judgment and a shorter period  
of time to pay the arrears, or a stipulation with a judgment and a longer period of time  
to pay. 
180 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:145 
judgment, the landlord is authorized to evict the tenant imme-
diately upon the tenant’s breach of the agreement terms. If the 
agreement does not include a judgment, the landlord must file a 
motion seeking the court’s permission to go forward with the 
eviction. 
Oftentimes, cases will include multiple settlement agree-
ments. Where the tenant fails to pay the arrears by the deadline 
in the first agreement, either the tenant or the landlord can 
bring the case back to court. The tenant most likely would do so 
to seek an extension of time to pay. The tenant can also do so 
where the landlord has failed to comply with orders to make re-
pairs. The landlord would bring the case back to court to seek 
authority for an eviction where a judgment was not awarded in 
the initial settlement agreement and the tenant failed to pay by 
the required deadline.168 Although parties have the option to 
have a hearing before the judge in all of these scenarios, the re-
sult will most frequently be a subsequent repayment agreement 
with a new deadline.169 
The eviction case procedures provide numerous opportuni-
ties for tenants to assert that repairs are needed in their units 
and for judges to order those repairs. The pro se answer form, 
used by virtually all tenants who submit an answer, provides as 
 
 168 Where a tenant fails to pay by the payment deadline and the stipulation includes 
a judgment, the tenant will file a post-judgment “Order to Show Cause” seeking a stay in 
the execution of the eviction. See Orders to Show Cause (New York State Unified Court 
System), archived at https://perma.cc/E63G-MSDR. Orders to Show Cause are liberally 
granted, and thus landlords tend to agree to a settlement allowing for a new deadline for 
the payment of the arrears. Where the original settlement stipulation does not include a 
judgment, the landlord will file a motion for issuance of the judgment and the execution 
upon the tenant’s failure to pay by the payment deadline. Such a motion will also typi-
cally resolve in a subsequent settlement stipulation, this time including a judgment, 
with a new payment deadline. These subsequent settlement stipulations are allocated in 
the same manner as initial settlement stipulations, and thus will include provisions re-
quiring the performance of repairs with the same regularity. 
 169 There are two general standards for the granting of orders to show cause in New 
York City Housing Court. First, if the order to show cause will grant merely a stay of 
execution for an eviction, there is wide judicial discretion in determining whether or not 
to grant the order—the court will grant the order if that is determined to be “just.” See 
NY CPLR § 2201. See also Joseph v Cheeseboro, 248 NYS2d 969, 971 (NY City Civ 1964) 
(stating that the standard for granting such orders is “the court’s own sense of discre-
tion, prudence, and justice”), revd on other grounds, 251 NYS2d 975 (NY Sup 1964). 
However, if the order to show cause will lead to vacatur of the judgment for eviction, a 
different standard prevails. In such cases (which generally result from a default judg-
ment against the tenant), the party bringing the order to show cause must show that the 
default was “excusable default.” See NY CPLR § 5015(a)(1). A showing of excusable de-
fault has two components that the tenant must show: “a reasonable excuse for defaulting 
and a meritorious defense to the proceeding.” East 168th Street Associates v Castillo, 79 
NYS3d 485, 489 (NY City Civ 2018). 
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one of the standardized response options that repairs or services 
are or were needed in the unit.170 Judges also ask tenants 
whether repairs are needed as part of the judge’s review of the 
settlement agreement.171 Wherever the tenant states that re-
pairs are needed, the judge will require that the agreement in-
clude a provision obligating their performance. The agreement 
will enumerate the specific defective conditions and will provide 
“access dates” on which the repairs will be made. This process is 
repeated for each settlement agreement in the case. 
Judges also have tools to verify the presence of defective 
conditions in the tenant’s unit. The Housing Code enforcement 
database, maintained by the New York City Department  
of Housing Preservation and Development (“HPD” or “the Code 
enforcement agency”), is publicly accessible online and is 
searchable by unit. This database includes a multiyear history 
of the complaints made, inspections performed, and violations 
issued for each unit. All judicial benches are equipped with 
desktop computers and wireless Internet, allowing judges to  
easily access the available data. Judges also have the authority 
to order the Code enforcement agency to perform Housing Code 
inspections.172 
C. Data 
Two distinct datasets were constructed for this study. The 
first dataset was a statistically significant random sample of all 
 
 170 The pro se answer form is a checkbox form that tenants complete orally at the 
Housing Court clerk’s window. The form asks tenants whether “[t]here are or were con-
ditions in the apartment and/or the building/house which the Petitioner did not repair 
and/or services which the Petitioner did not provide.” Civil Court of the City of New 
York, Answer in Writing and Verification (Form CIV-LT-91b) (May 2013), archived at 
https://perma.cc/L72Z-ERBH. This plain language wording is distinct from the legalese 
often used in pro se pleading forms in other jurisdictions. See Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 
66 (cited in note 28) (noting that the pro se pleading form in other jurisdictions asks ten-
ants to “state whether they want relief based on violation of the ‘warranty of habitability’ 
and the ‘covenant of quiet enjoyment,’ terms which have no meaning to these tenants or 
even most lay people”). The pro se answer form used in New York City Housing Court 
does not provide space for tenants to specify which repairs are needed. Thus, as de-
scribed in the text accompanying note 191, cases are never identified as having a merito-
rious warranty of habitability claim based solely on the assertion of needed repairs in 
the Answer. 
 171 An allocution is a judge’s review of the stipulation with an unrepresented party 
to ensure that the party enters into the stipulation freely and voluntarily and under-
stands the terms to which he or she is agreeing. Because questions about repairs are 
part of judges’ standardized allocutions, many landlord attorneys will ask tenants if re-
pairs are needed and will include repair obligations in the stipulation voluntarily. 
 172 See, for example, Judicial Request/Order for Housing Inspection, Beaumont 
Management Group, LLC v Jackson, LT-021832-16/BX, *5 (NY City Civ 2016). 
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nonpayment of rent eviction cases filed in 2016173 in which the 
tenant appeared.174 The dataset was built using the New York 
Office of Court Administration’s comprehensive database of all 
eviction case filings.175 This Office of Court Administration data-
base identified the index number, case type (nonpayment of rent 
or “holdover”176), and whether the tenant appeared or defaulted 
for each case filed.177 Approximately ninety-seven thousand cas-
es satisfied the inclusion criteria.178 From these 97,000 cases, 
746 index numbers were randomly selected using a data ran-
domization generation tool. The selection was stratified in order 
to account for borough-level differences in the data.179 Seven 
hundred and forty-six cases is a representative sample of the to-
tal study population at a 90 percent confidence interval, with a 
margin of error of 3 percent and a response distribution of 
50 percent.180 The files for all 746 cases were retrieved from the 
 
 173 2016 was the most recent year for which complete case data was available during 
the time period this study was conducted (May–October 2018). Many cases filed in 2017, 
particularly those filed in the latter half of the year, were still ongoing in 2018. 
 174 A tenant appears by filing an Answer at the Housing Court clerk’s office. Cases 
in which the tenant defaulted were excluded because a default judgment generally pre-
cludes the tenant from asserting claims and defenses. Even where a tenant is successful 
in removing a default judgment at a later stage in the case, the tenant typically negoti-
ates at a weakened bargaining position and thus does not have the same leverage to in-
voke the warranty of habitability. See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 
21 (cited in note 19) (“The entry of a default judgment against a tenant who does not (or 
cannot) appear in court limits that tenant’s range of options and all but closes the win-
dow of opportunity for consideration of viable defenses and alternatives to disposses-
sion.”). Inclusion of cases with default judgments in the study would have muddied the 
data, causing the findings to reflect both the structural barriers to usage and the lack of 
availability of the claim due to the default. Since the goal of the study was to assess the 
structural barriers to usage, defaulted cases were excluded. 
 175 The NYU Furman Center was provided this database by the Office of Court  
Administration pursuant to a data use agreement that restricts usage to certain  
research purposes. 
 176 See note 162. 
 177 This dataset also included other information; however, the only data used for 
this study were the index number, case type, and appearance of the tenant. This data 
was used only to determine the size of the total study population and to identify a  
random representative sample of cases. 
 178 A total of 202,300 nonpayment of rent eviction petitions were filed in 2016. See 
note 162. Thus, the tenant defaulted in over half of all the nonpayment proceedings. 
 179 A stratified sample is one that is proportional to certain differentiating criteria. 
Thus here, the number of cases from each borough in the sample was proportional to the 
number of cases from that borough in the total dataset. The sample was a 0.5 percent 
stratified sample. 
 180 The margin of error states the amount of random sampling error in a study’s re-
sults. The confidence interval is a type of interval estimate that might contain the true 
value of an unknown population parameter. The associated confidence level quantifies 
the level of confidence that the parameter lies in the interval. The response distribution 
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Housing Court, scanned, and coded according to criteria and 
guidelines described below. The unit-level addresses for these 
cases were also matched with the HPD Housing Code enforce-
ment database. This matching allowed each case to be linked to 
the unit’s Housing Code complaint and violation history. 
The second dataset was a random sample of all nonpayment 
of rent eviction cases filed in 2016 in which the tenant appeared 
and in which one or more “hazardous” or “immediately hazard-
ous” Housing Code violations were open at the unit at the time 
the case was filed.181 This dataset was constructed by matching 
the Office of Court Administration database with the HPD 
Housing Code violation database at the unit level.182 The match-
ing identified 1,553 cases. From these 1,553 cases, 507 case in-
dex numbers were randomly selected using a data randomiza-
tion generation tool. The selection was stratified in order to 
account for any borough-level differences in the data. Five hun-
dred and seven cases is a representative sample of the total 
study population at a 90 percent confidence interval, with a 
margin of error of 3 percent and a response distribution of 
50 percent. The files for all 507 cases were retrieved from the 
New York City Housing Court, scanned, and coded according to 
the same criteria and guidelines described below. 
D. Methodology 
The case files in both datasets were coded across seventeen 
different criteria. A detailed description of the coding guidelines 
is provided in the Appendix. The criteria included whether the 
tenant was represented;183 whether the Answer asserted needed 
repairs; the outcomes of the first settlement agreement, includ-
ing whether a possessory judgment entered, whether a rent 
abatement was awarded, and the length of time provided to the 
 
is the probability distribution of the response (target) variable. Fifty percent is the most 
conservative choice for the response distribution, yielding the largest sample size. 
 181 “Hazardous” Housing Code violations are classified as “Class B” level violations 
and “immediately hazardous” violations are classified as “Class C” level violations. See 
note 24. 
 182 The Office of Court Administration dataset included the unit-level address for 
each case filed. For each Housing Code violation, the HPD dataset included the unit-
level address, the dates the violation was open and closed, and the violation classifica-
tion level (A, B, or C). The HPD data did not include information for violations at proper-
ties owned by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)—in other words, public 
housing—and thus the matched dataset used for this study was not inclusive of nor can 
it be taken to reflect outcomes involving NYCHA units. 
 183 Representation status was coded based on whether the tenant was represented 
when he or she entered into the first settlement agreement in the case. 
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tenant to repay the arrears;184 whether the first and any subse-
quent settlement agreements required the landlord to perform 
“substantial repairs”; whether the judge ordered a Housing Code 
inspection; and whether the judge had accessed the Housing 
Code enforcement records of the unit.185 “Substantial repairs” 
were defined as repairs of a condition sufficiently serious to con-
stitute a violation of the warranty of habitability.186 
1. All nonpayment cases dataset. 
The first dataset—which I will refer to as the “all nonpay-
ment cases” dataset—constituted a representative sample of all 
nonpayment of rent eviction cases in which the tenant had the 
ability to pursue claims and defenses.187 Within this dataset, cas-
es were grouped based on whether the tenant had a meritorious 
 
 184 These outcomes were only recorded for the first settlement agreement because 
this agreement reflects what is generally the only substantive negotiation in the case. A 
subsequent agreement (other than a discontinuance) will only occur if a tenant has de-
faulted on the first agreement, and thus a tenant in that posture is in a weakened nego-
tiating position. A tenant in that posture will also typically have waived defenses and 
claims in the first agreement, particularly if judgment has entered. 
 185 The pro se Answer form provides an option for tenants to assert that repairs are 
needed in their apartments. See note 170. The form does not prompt tenants to specify 
which repairs are needed. Settlement agreements, by contrast, nearly always specify the 
repairs to be performed where they require repairs. 
 186 Repairs of all conditions issues that qualify as rent impairing pursuant to NY 
Multiple Dwelling Law § 302-a were included as “substantial repairs.” All conditions 
that have been found to constitute a violation of the warranty of habitability were also 
included. These include, inter alia: lack of heat and/or hot water, see Parker 72nd  
Associates v Isaacs, 436 NYS2d 542, 544 (NY City Civ 1980); flooding, see Spatz v  
Axelrod Management Co, Inc, 630 NYS2d 461, 463–64 (NY City Civ 1995); fumes and 
smoke, see Goldman v O’Brien, NY L J 28 (NY Sup Aug 14, 2000); leaking gas, see 
Goodman v Ramirez, 420 NYS2d 185, 188 (NY City Civ 1979); lead paint, see Chase v 
Pistolese, 739 NYS2d 250, 252–53 (NY City Ct 2002); bedbugs, see Jefferson House  
Associates, LLC v Boyle, 2005 WL 465171, *3 (NY Just Ct); mold, see 360 West 51st 
Street v Cornell, NY L J 28 (NY Civ Ct Sept 6, 2005), affd, 831 NYS2d 634, 635 (NY Sup 
2007); broken appliances (for example, refrigerator or stove), see Rosewohl Enterprises, 
LLC v Schiffer, 2006 WL 1981750, *1 (NY Sup); cockroaches, see 501 New York LLC v 
Anekwe, 2006 WL 3859077, *1 (NY Sup); secondhand smoke, see Poyck v Bryant, 820 
NYS2d 774, 777 (NY City Civ 2006); mice and/or rats, see Northwood Village, Inc v Cu-
ret, NY L J 34 (NY Dist May 6, 1998); noise and/or dust, see Mantica R Corp NV v 
Malone, 436 NYS2d 797, 800 (NY City Civ 1981); failure to install kitchen facilities, see 
Varna Trust, NY L J at 32; and broken locks, see Jangla Realty Co v Gravagna, 447 
NYS2d 338, 341 (NY City Civ 1981). 
 187 The tenant had the ability to pursue claims and defenses in these cases because 
the tenant filed an Answer. A tenant who does not file an Answer defaults and, in most 
instances, will receive a default judgment. Although it is possible to defend a case after 
receiving a default judgment, a tenant in this posture will not have the same opportunity 
to pursue claims and defenses as a tenant who appears. See note 168. 
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warranty of habitability claim.188 Cases were assigned to the 
comparison group wherenre all available information indicated 
that the tenant had not experienced conditions of disrepair suffi-
cient to establish a warranty of habitability claim.189 Specifically, 
cases were assigned to the comparison group where the tenant 
did not assert repairs in the Answer, there were no substantial 
repairs included in the settlement agreement, and there were no 
open “hazardous” (Class B) or “immediately hazardous” 
(Class C) code violations at the unit at the time the case was 
filed.190 Thirty-four percent of all nonpayment of rent cases met 
these conditions. I refer to this group as the “no meritorious 
claim” group. 
Cases were assigned to the meritorious claim group based 
on the presence of factors indicating that the tenant had experi-
enced serious conditions of disrepair, and thus likely could have 
established a warranty of habitability claim. These factors in-
cluded (1) the assertion that repairs were needed in the tenant’s 
Answer; (2) the inclusion of substantial repairs in the initial set-
tlement agreement; and (3) the inclusion of substantial repairs 
in multiple settlement agreements. Some evidence of conditions 
of disrepair was present in the majority of nonpayment of rent 
cases. In half (50 percent) of all nonpayment of rent cases, ten-
ants asserted that repairs were needed in their Answer to the 
complaint.191 Slightly over half (51 percent) of cases included 
 
 188 Some cases did not fall into either classification because it was ambiguous 
whether the tenant had a meritorious warranty of habitability claim. These cases were 
excluded from the analysis. 
 189 The available information, however, did not provide insight into whether the 
tenant had suffered conditions of disrepair sufficient to constitute a violation of the war-
ranty of habitability at an earlier time in his or her tenancy. Thus, there may have been 
some cases included in the comparison group that were cases in which the tenant had 
the ability to pursue a warranty of habitability claim. 
 190 All three conditions were required to be met for a case to be assigned to the com-
parison group. Cases in which needed repairs were asserted in the Answer but in which 
substantial repairs were not included in the settlement agreement were not included in 
either group because it was ambiguous whether the tenant had a meritorious warranty 
of habitability claim. These cases were excluded from the analysis. 
 191 It is unknown to what extent the tenants’ assertions may have been untruthful—
tenants could have, for example, invoked the claim without basis because they believed it 
would bolster their defense. To assess for this possibility, I compared the frequency with 
which tenants asserted needed repairs in their Answer with the frequency with which 
tenants claimed a service defect, which was offered as another checkbox option on the 
standardized form. A service defect is in some ways a stronger defense to an eviction case 
than a warranty of habitability claim—where a tenant has not been properly served, the 
court has no jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed. Yet only 10 percent of tenants 
claimed this defense. This finding suggests that tenants were not simply checking every 
box that could be beneficial to their case, and thus supports the truthfulness of tenants’ 
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substantial repairs in the initial settlement agreement. There 
was not perfect overlap between cases in which repairs were as-
serted in the Answer and imposed in the settlement agree-
ment—only 36 percent of cases met both conditions. There are 
two potential explanations for this finding. First, the Answer 
does not specify which repairs are needed, and thus in a certain 
percentage of cases the repairs claimed were likely insubstan-
tial. Second, new repair needs may have arisen between the fil-
ing of the Answer and the settlement agreement, and thus some 
settlement agreements may have included substantial repairs 
that were not needed at the time of the Answer.192 Overall, 
10 percent of cases had repairs asserted in the Answer and sub-




assertions of needed repairs. Moreover, research in other jurisdictions has found that ten-
ants’ allegations of conditions of disrepair are generally valid. In a longitudinal study of 
seventy-three landlord-tenant cases in a housing court in Washington, DC, Professor 
Steinberg found that “98 percent of [landlords] later subject to housing inspections were 
deemed responsible for at least one housing code violation.” Steinberg, 42 L & Soc In-
quiry at 1079 (cited in note 22). The primary purpose of this housing court, known as the 
Housing Conditions Court, is to address substandard housing. Id at 1064–66. 
 192 The average length of time between the Answer and the settlement agreement 
was twenty-one days. 
 193 This figure is likely relatively low in part because many cases do not involve 
multiple settlement agreements. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ALL NONPAYMENT OF RENT 
EVICTION CASES 
 
Evidence of conditions of disrepair Percentage of 
nonpayment of 
rent eviction cases 
Need for repairs asserted in Answer 50% 
Substantial repairs in settlement 
agreement* 
51% 
Repairs asserted in Answer and sub-
stantial repairs in settlement agreement  
36% 
Repairs in Answer and substantial  
repairs in multiple settlement  
agreements* 
10% 
No evidence of conditions of disrepair**  34% 
 * One of two “meritorious claim” groups 
** “No meritorious claim” group 
 
The group of cases with meritorious warranty of habitability 
claims—which I will refer to as the “meritorious claim” group—
was configured and tested using two different definitions: 
(1) cases in which the settlement agreement required the land-
lord to make substantial repairs (Definition 1), and (2) cases in 
which multiple settlement agreements required the landlord to 
make substantial repairs and the tenant asserted that repairs 
were needed in his or her Answer (Definition 2).194 The criteria 
included in Definition 1 were more inclusive but less confident 
indicators of a meritorious warranty of habitability claim, 
whereas the criteria used in the second definition were less in-
clusive but more confident indicators.195 In the Definition 2 
 
 194 Cases were only included in the “meritorious claim” group where the conditions 
requiring repairs, as stated in the settlement stipulation, were sufficient to constitute a 
warranty of habitability violation. Thus, where a settlement stipulation required a land-
lord to repair only a minor condition that did not affect habitability, the case was not in-
cluded in the “likely meritorious warranty claim” group. 
 195 The first group includes all cases in which it was likely that the tenant had a 
meritorious warranty of habitability claim. Virtually all cases (over 99 percent of cases 
in the “all nonpayment of rent eviction cases” dataset) result in a settlement stipulation, 
and the inclusion of substantial repairs in the stipulation likely indicates that the tenant 
had a meritorious claim. However, there is a possibility that the tenant was lying by say-
ing repairs were needed, or that perhaps the tenant had not notified that repairs were 
needed prior to the settlement discussion. Thus, this definition could be overly inclusive 
by encompassing cases in which the tenant did not have a meritorious claim. The second 
group includes cases in which there was a near certainty that the tenant had a meritori-
ous claim. If the tenant stated that repairs were needed in his or her Answer and the 
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group, cases were included only if two or more settlement 
agreements required repairs of the same conditions and the ac-
cess dates in the first agreement had passed by the date of the 
second agreement.196 
2. Violation dataset. 
The second dataset—which I will refer to as the “violation 
dataset”—constitutes a representative sample of cases in which 
one or more “hazardous” (Class B) or “immediately hazardous” 
(Class C) Housing Code violations were open at the unit at the 
time of filing. These are cases in which there was an even 
stronger indication that the tenant had a meritorious warranty 
of habitability claim. Conditions of disrepair that constitute 
Class B or Class C violations nearly always affect habitability,197 
and the open status of the violation indicates both that the land-
lord had notice of the condition of disrepair and that the land-
lord likely had not yet completed repairs.198 This dataset thus 
 
landlord agreed to make substantial repairs in not one but two or more settlement stipu-
lations, we know that the landlord had notice of the conditions and failed to make re-
pairs. Moreover, the tenant’s persistence in asserting the conditions and the need for re-
pairs suggests a low probability of falsification. However, the use of this definition is 
likely to exclude cases in which the tenant has a meritorious claim. Many cases resolve 
with only one settlement stipulation, and it is possible that some tenants are not asked 
or do not know to mention that repairs are needed when they file their Answer. 
 196 The goal of using these criteria was to identify cases in which the landlord ap-
peared to have shirked his or her obligations to repair in the first agreement. Where the 
landlord had shirked such obligations, there is a strong likelihood that the tenant had a 
meritorious warranty of habitability claim because the landlord was on notice and failed 
to make the necessary repairs. It is unknown in these cases, however, if the failure to 
repair was the result of the tenant’s refusal to provide access. 
 197 Conditions that qualify as Class C violations include, inter alia, rodents and in-
adequate supply of heat or hot water. Conditions that qualify as Class B violations in-
clude, inter alia, inoperable smoke detectors, mold, and vermin issues. Ninety-five per-
cent of the cases included in the violation dataset had at least one open Class C 
violation. 
 198 In order for a violation to be closed (often referred to as “certified”), there must 
be a determination that the violation has been corrected. Prior to the deadline for cor-
recting the violation (twenty-four hours for a Class C violation, thirty days for a Class B 
violation, and ninety days for a Class A violation), a landlord may self-certify the viola-
tion as corrected by mail or through an online system. Once the deadline for correction of 
the violation has passed, a landlord must submit a dismissal request to the Code en-
forcement agency (the Department of Housing Preservation and Development, or 
“HPD”). Upon the filing of a dismissal request, an inspection will be conducted and the 
housing inspector will deem the violation corrected when so warranted. Certain viola-
tions require the submission of documentation along with the request for dismissal. 
Where a violation has been open for longer than twelve months and no new violations 
have been issued during that time period, the landlord can apply for a voluntary  
reissuance of the violation and may then self-certify the violation as corrected by the 
newly established deadline for correction. See New York City Department of Housing 
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comprised a third meritorious claim group. At times, subsets of 
the violation dataset were also used to test results among 
groups of cases with even stronger evidence of a meritorious 
warranty of habitability claim. Thus, outcomes were analyzed 
for subgroups of violation cases where the tenant had also as-
serted that repairs were needed in the Answer, substantial re-
pairs were included in the settlement agreement, and/or sub-
stantial repairs were included in multiple settlement 
agreements. 
The purpose of the violation dataset was primarily supple-
mental, as the cases included likely comprise only a small frac-
tion of all nonpayment of rent cases in which the tenant had a 
meritorious warranty of habitability claim. Many tenants do not 
report defective conditions to the City, or do so only once their 
landlord has repeatedly failed to make repairs.199 Thus, the “all 
nonpayment cases” dataset provides a more comprehensive rep-
resentation of the use of the warranty of habitability across all 
nonpayment of rent eviction cases. The violation dataset is in-
cluded to respond to potential concerns that the methodology 
used to identify cases with meritorious warranty of habitability 
claims in the first dataset are overly inclusive, and thus that the 
findings are diluted. Each case included in the violation dataset 
had on average 3.7 Class C violations, 0.5 Class B violations, 
and 1.3 Class A violations open at the time of case filing, total-
ing 5.5 open violations per case.200 Ninety-five percent of cases in 
the dataset had one or more open Class C violation. 
 
Preservation & Development, Violation Removal—Overdue Violations *4–10 (Mar 2017), 
archived at https://perma.cc/8UME-89DQ. It is possible that in some cases included in 
this dataset, the violation had been corrected but the landlord had not yet undertaken 
the appropriate procedures to close the violation. It is also possible that there were some 
cases with uncorrected Class B and Class C violations at the time of case filing that were 
not included in the dataset because the landlord had falsely certified the violations as 
corrected. See generally Ashford, Leaks, Mold and Rats (cited in note 147) (reporting  
instances of false correction certifications by landlords). 
 199 See generally New Settlement Apartments’ Community Action for Safe Apart-
ments (CASA) and the Community Development Project (CDP) at the Urban Justice 
Center, Tipping the Scales: A Report of Tenant Experiences in Bronx Housing Court (Mar 
2013), archived at https://perma.cc/MB6A-BN7M. Oral or written notice to the landlord 
is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of a warranty of habitability claim. See 
note 154. 
 200 Repairs were asserted in the Answer in 71 percent of violation cases, and sub-
stantial repairs were included in the settlement agreement in 68 percent of violation 
cases. In 19 percent of violation cases, substantial repairs were included in multiple set-
tlement agreements, and in 16 percent of violation cases, substantial repairs were in-
cluded in multiple settlement agreements and repairs were asserted in the Answer. 
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Using both datasets, Welch’s two-sample t-tests and  
Pearson’s chi-squared tests were performed to compare case 
outcomes among the three “meritorious claim” groups and the 
“no meritorious claim” group. As described in more detail below, 
outcomes compared included rent abatements, the rate of pos-
sessory judgments, the length of the repayment period, and or-
ders to perform repairs. 
IV.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This Part provides the results of the statistical analysis and 
discusses the answers they provide to the four specific research 
questions. The analysis revealed that many more tenants had 
meritorious warranty of habitability claims than received any 
benefit from the claim. A small percentage of tenants with meri-
torious claims received rent abatements; no tenants, however, 
received other benefits, such as longer repayment periods or 
avoidance of a possessory judgment, as a result of having a mer-
itorious claim. And while settlement agreements very frequently 
imposed repair obligations, it appears that those obligations 
most often went unfulfilled and unenforced. The lack of legal 
representation accounted somewhat for the findings but was  
insufficient to fully explain them. 
Parts IV.A and IV.B provide the results of the statistical 
analysis for the three types of case outcomes studied: rent 
abatements, possessory judgments, and length of time for pay-
ment of the arrears. Part IV.C provides the same for the data re-
lated to the enforcement of repair obligations, and Part IV.D pro-
vides the results of the analyses regarding legal representation. 
A. Question 1: To What Extent Do Tenants Who Have 
Meritorious Warranty of Habitability Claims Receive Rent 
Abatements? 
The data analysis revealed that tenants who had meritori-
ous warranty of habitability claims rarely received rent abate-
ments. Rent abatements were granted in only 1.75 percent of all 
nonpayment of rent eviction cases, even though between 36 and 
51 percent of the tenants in the study had meritorious claims. 
Put differently, a tenant with a meritorious warranty of habita-
bility claim had between a 2.35 and 3.29 percent chance of  
receiving a rent abatement generally, and a 9 percent chance  
if there were open code violations in the unit. Even using the 
most conservative set of indicators to identify cases with merito-
rious warranty claims—cases in which there were open code  
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violations, the tenant asserted repairs in the Answer, and sub-
stantial repairs were included in multiple settlement agree-
ments—only 15 percent received rent abatements. In sum, the 
overwhelming majority of tenants who were entitled to rent 
abatements did not receive them. A detailed description of the 
statistical findings is provided below. 
1. All nonpayment of rent cases. 
Rent abatements were awarded in 1.75 percent of all non-
payment of rent cases (13 out of 745).201 The percentage rose on-
ly slightly when calculated within cases with evidence of condi-
tions of disrepair. Tenants were awarded rent abatements in 
3.5 percent of cases with repairs asserted in the Answer. Of cas-
es in which substantial repairs were included in the first settle-
ment agreement, 2.35 percent were awarded rent abatements, 
and of cases in which substantial repairs were included in the 
settlement agreement and repairs were asserted in the Answer, 
3.29 percent were awarded abatements. Abatements were 
granted in 2.76 percent of cases in which repairs were asserted 
in the Answer and substantial repairs were included in multiple 
settlement agreements. No abatements were awarded in the 
control group. The average abatement amount was $1,955. 
These results are presented in Table 2 below. 
  
 
 201 For an explanation of how I coded the awarding of a rent abatement, see the  
Appendix. 
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TABLE 2: RENT ABATEMENTS IN ALL NONPAYMENT OF  
RENT CASES 
Case Classification Abatement Rate 
All cases 1.75% 
Repairs in Answer 3.5% 
Substantial repairs in  
settlement agreement* 
2.35% 
Repairs in Answer and  
substantial repairs in  
settlement agreement 
3.29% 
Repairs in Answer and  
substantial repairs in multiple 
settlement agreements* 
2.76% 
No conditions of disrepair** 0% 
 * One of two “meritorious warranty claim” groups 
** “No meritorious warranty claim” group 
2. Violation cases. 
Rent abatements were awarded in 9 percent of all violation 
cases, even though the tenants in all such cases had meritorious 
claims. The rate of rent abatements did not increase substantial-
ly even where additional evidence existed of conditions of disre-
pair. Tenants were awarded rent abatements in 10 percent of 
cases in which the tenant has asserted that repairs were needed 
in his or her Answer. Of cases in which substantial repairs were 
included in the first settlement agreement, 13 percent were 
awarded rent abatements, and of cases in which substantial re-
pairs were included in multiple settlement agreements, the 
same share—13 percent—were granted abatements. Abate-
ments were awarded in 15 percent of cases in which repairs 
were asserted in the Answer and substantial repairs were in-
cluded in multiple settlement agreements. The average abate-
ment amount in the violation dataset was $2,275. These results 
are presented in Table 3 below. 
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TABLE 3: RENT ABATEMENTS IN VIOLATION CASES 
Case Classification Abatement Rate 
All violation cases 9% 
Repairs in Answer 10% 
Substantial repairs in  
settlement agreement 
13% 
Repairs in Answer and  
substantial repairs in  
settlement agreement 
13% 




The data revealed that tenants received rent abatements at 
very low rates even where there were multiple indicators that 
they had meritorious warranty of habitability claims. The find-
ings showed a large operationalization gap as measured by the 
award of a rent abatement: only between 2.35 and 9 percent of 
tenants who had a meritorious warranty of habitability claim 
actually benefited from that claim. At minimum, these findings 
show that the warranty of habitability is not operating in prac-
tice as it is designed on paper: to condition rental obligations on 
repairs. Instead, most tenants—approximately ninety-eight out 
of one hundred—are being held to their full rental obligations 
regardless of defective conditions. The result is that landlords 
are rarely facing financial consequences for neglecting their 
properties. 
The data also showed that tenants were most likely to re-
ceive rent abatements when there were open code violations in 
the unit. Tenants were substantially less likely (approximately 
one-half to one-quarter as likely) to receive abatements when 
there was other evidence of conditions of disrepair but no code 
violations. This finding is striking. Although code violations pro-
vide proof of the existence of conditions of disrepair, a primary 
motivation for enacting the warranty of habitability was to pro-
vide an alternative to code enforcement for holding landlords ac-
countable for conditions of disrepair. Courts, advocates, and leg-
islators believed that by giving tenants the power to act as 
“private attorney[s] general” to enforce habitability standards, 
the warranty would function as an important work-around to  
often inefficient and poorly resourced housing code enforcement 
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systems.202 But to the extent the warranty of habitability pro-
vides meaningful relief only where the Code enforcement system 
has been activated, as is indicated by this data, the law is not 
serving this purpose. 
B. Question 2: To What Extent Do Tenants with Meritorious 
Warranty of Habitability Claims Receive Other Benefits 
from the Claim, Such as a Longer Time Period to Repay 
Rental Arrears or the Avoidance of a Possessory Judgment? 
The data also ruled out the possibility that tenants with 
meritorious warranty of habitability claims receive benefits from 
the claim other than rent abatements. As described above, the 
other key outcomes negotiated in a nonpayment of rent eviction 
case are (1) whether a possessory judgment is awarded to the 
landlord,203 and (2) the length of the repayment period afforded 
to the tenant. The analyses of both datasets showed that there 
was no statistically significant difference in either of these case 
outcomes between cases with and without meritorious warranty 
of habitability claims. Tenants with meritorious warranty 
claims were statistically just as likely to receive a possessory 
judgment as tenants without warranty claims.204 In cases in 
which possessory judgments were awarded, there was no statis-
tically significant difference in the length of the repayment peri-
od. Similarly, in cases in which no possessory judgment was 
awarded, there was no statistically significant difference in the 
length of repayment period.205 Thus, tenants did not appear to be 
“trading” the opportunity for a rent abatement for other types of 
desirable outcomes in their cases. A detailed description of the 
statistical findings is provided below. 
 
 202 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 12 (cited in note 19); notes 
44–53 and accompanying text. 
 203 For a detailed description of the meaning and significance of a possessory  
judgment, see note 23. 
 204 Tenants were slightly less likely to receive possessory judgments in cases in 
which there were open code violations, but this finding was not statistically significant. 
 205 The length of repayment period is compared separately for cases with and with-
out possessory judgments because these two outcomes are typically negotiated in an  
inverse relationship with each other—tenants who wish to avoid a judgment can typical-
ly do so in exchange for a shorter repayment period, whereas tenants who prefer a longer 
repayment period can typically achieve this by agreement to a possessory judgment. See 
note 167. 
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1. All nonpayment of rent cases. 
Among “no meritorious claim” cases, 74 percent had posses-
sory judgments and the average length of time for repayment of 
arrears was 37.6 days. Where a case had a possessory judgment, 
the average length of time for repayment was forty-two days, 
whereas when the case did not have a possessory judgment, the 
average repayment period was twenty-four days. As described 
in Part III.D.1, two different sets of criteria were used to identi-
fy the “meritorious warranty claim” group within the “all non-
payment of rent cases” dataset: (1) cases with substantial re-
pairs in the settlement agreement (Definition 1), and (2) cases 
with substantial repairs in multiple settlement agreements and 
repairs asserted in the Answer (Definition 2). Among cases sat-
isfying the criteria under Definition 1, 73 percent had possesso-
ry judgments and the average length of time for the repayment 
of the arrears was 39.3 days. Where a case had a possessory 
judgment, the average length of time for repayment was forty-
four days, whereas when a case did not have a possessory judg-
ment, the average repayment period was twenty-six days. 
Among cases satisfying the criteria under Definition 2, 
75 percent had possessory judgments and the average length  
of time for repayment of arrears was forty days. Where a case 
had a possessory judgment, the average length of time for  
repayment was forty-four days, whereas when a case did not 
have a possessory judgment, the average repayment period was 
twenty-nine days.206 
 
 206 In a significant share of cases (22 percent), the settlement agreement was an 
agreement to discontinue the case (a “discontinuance”) rather than a repayment agree-
ment. A discontinuance generally results where the tenant has paid the entirety of the 
rent owed. The likelihood of a tenant receiving a discontinuance did not appear to be af-
fected by the presence of a warranty of habitability claim. In fact, the likelihood of re-
ceiving a discontinuance was lower among tenants who appeared more likely to have 
meritorious warranty of habitability claims as compared with tenants who did not. The 
discontinuance rate among tenants with repairs asserted in their Answer was 
20 percent, compared with 25 percent among tenants without repairs asserted in the  
Answer. The discontinuance rate in all violation cases was 19 percent. Among tenants 
with substantial repairs asserted in their settlement agreement, the discontinuance rate 
was 13 percent as compared with 35 percent among tenants with no repairs included in 
their settlement agreement. The latter disparity—and the low discontinuance rate when 
repairs were included in the settlement in particular—may exist because judges do not 
consistently perform allocutions of the settlement agreement where the agreement is a 
discontinuance. Thus, many tenants who needed substantial repairs may not have had 
the opportunity to include those repairs in their settlement. Nevertheless, the compari-
son among cases with and without repairs asserted in the Answer and violation cases 
indicates that tenants with likely warranty of habitability claims did not appear to be 
using their claims to achieve discontinuances. 
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Welch’s two-sample t-tests and Pearson’s chi-squared tests 
were performed to test for statistical significance in the differ-
ence in outcomes between the “no meritorious claim” cases and 
each of the two “meritorious warranty claim” case groups. There 
was no statistically significant difference in outcomes between 
the “no meritorious claim” comparison group and either of the 
two “meritorious warranty claim” group. The full statistical re-
sults are reported in Tables 4 and 5 below. 
2. Violation cases. 
Sixty-four percent of violation cases had possessory judg-
ments. The average length of time for repayment of arrears 
among all violation cases was 36.4 days. The average repayment 
period was 42 days for cases with possessory judgments, and 26 
days for cases without possessory judgments. 
Pearson’s chi-squared and Welch’s two-sample t-tests were 
performed to test for statistical significance in the difference in 
outcomes between the violation cases and the “no meritorious 
claim” cases (in the “all nonpayment cases” dataset). The results 
showed no statistical significance in the average length of re-
payment period or in the rate of possessory judgments. The av-
erage length of the repayment period also did not differ at a lev-
el of statistical significance when the issuance of a possessory 
judgment was held constant. Specifically, the repayment period 
was the same in violation cases with possessory judgments and 
“no meritorious claim” cases with possessory judgments. There 
was also no statistically significant difference between violation 
cases without possessory judgments and “no meritorious claim” 
cases without possessory judgments. The full statistical results 
are reported in Tables 4 and 5 below. 
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TABLE 4: POSSESSORY JUDGMENT RATE IN ALL NONPAYMENT OF 
RENT AND VIOLATION CASES 
 





P-value207 based on 
difference with no 
meritorious claim 
group 
Substantial repairs in 
settlement agreement* 
73% 0.78 




Violation cases 64% 0.09 
No conditions of  
disrepair** 
74% — 
 * One of two “meritorious claim” groups among all nonpay-
ment of rent cases 
** “No meritorious claim” group 
  
 
 207 The p-value, or probability value of asymptotic significance, indicates the level of 
statistical significance of the outcome. P-values less than or equal to 0.05 indicate statis-
tical significance, whereas p-values greater than 0.05 indicate that the outcome is not 
statistically significant. 
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TABLE 5: AVERAGE LENGTH OF REPAYMENT PERIOD IN ALL 
NONPAYMENT OF RENT AND VIOLATION CASES 
Case classification Repayment 
period 
P-value based on 























































































 * One of two “meritorious claim” groups among all  
nonpayment of rent cases 
** “No meritorious claim” group 
3. Discussion. 
This research is the first to address the possibility that ten-
ants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims are bene-
fiting from the claim by achieving favorable case outcomes other 
than rent abatements. It effectively rules out this possibility. 
While tenants with open code violations at their units were 
slightly more likely to avoid possessory judgments as compared 
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with tenants without warranty claims, this difference was small 
and not statistically significant. Moreover, such tenants still 
“paid” for this avoidance of the judgment with a shorter repay-
ment period, equal to that awarded to tenants without warranty 
claims who also avoided a possessory judgment.208 The achieved 
benefit was therefore minimal. 
These findings, together with the rent abatement findings, 
indicate that the vast majority of tenants with meritorious war-
ranty of habitability claims did not receive any material benefit 
from the claim. The small percentage of tenants who received 
rent abatements indeed comprised the only tenants with likely 
meritorious warranty claims who benefited from the law at all. 
In other words, between 2.35 and 9 percent of all tenants who 
should have been able to invoke the law were able to successful-
ly do so. The warranty of habitability did not provide any benefit 
at all to approximately 91 to 97 percent of tenants who appeared 
to satisfy the elements of the claim. 
C. Question 3: Does the Warranty of Habitability Serve as an 
Effective Tool to Hold Landlords Accountable for Making 
Needed Repairs? 
It is possible that although most tenants are unable to suc-
cessfully invoke the warranty to achieve rent abatements or 
other beneficial outcomes in their eviction cases, they are effec-
tively using the law as a tool to compel landlords to perform 
needed repairs. The settlement agreements in slightly over half 
of all nonpayment of rent cases included an order obligating the 
landlord to make substantial repairs, which would seem to indi-
cate that the law is being used in this way.209 Yet the fact that 
the settlement agreement included such an obligation does not 
necessarily mean that the landlord complied with it and made 
the repairs. 
The data do not allow for conclusions to be drawn regarding 
the extent to which repairs were ever completed once they were 
ordered in settlement agreements. However, cases that have 
 
 208 It is also possible that the difference in the rate of possessory judgments is  
attributable to differences in preferences between tenants with code violations and those 
with no conditions of disrepair. To the extent tenants with code violations are genuinely 
withholding rent and have saved the money, they may be more likely to prefer an out-
come comprised of a shorter repayment period and no possessory judgment rather than 
one comprised of a longer repayment period and the award of a possessory judgment. 
 209 Settlement agreements in cases that were converted to holdovers were excluded 
from this analysis. 
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multiple settlement agreements provide insight into the extent 
to which repair orders are followed. Cases result in more than 
one settlement agreement when a tenant fails to comply with 
the repayment terms set forth in the initial settlement agree-
ment.210 The landlord then takes the next step toward eviction, 
and either the landlord or the tenant will bring the case back to 
court.211 The parties will then enter into a new settlement 
agreement, typically a repayment agreement.212 If applicable, 
that agreement will again include an order for the landlord to 
make any necessary repairs. 
Among cases that have (1) repairs ordered in the initial set-
tlement agreement, and (2) a subsequent settlement agreement 
entered into after the “access dates” included in the initial set-
tlement agreement, the frequency with which the same repairs 
are included in a subsequent settlement agreement provides 
some indication of the extent to which repair orders are fol-
lowed. Specifically, where a case has two or more settlement 
agreements and the first agreement included an order for the 
landlord to make repairs, the fact that the same repairs are or-
dered in a subsequent settlement agreement (entered into after 
the access dates for repairs in the first agreement have passed) 
strongly suggests that the landlord did not comply with the ini-
tial repair order.213 Conversely, where a case has two or more 
 
 210 In theory, a case could also have multiple settlement agreements because the 
landlord failed to make the ordered repairs and the tenant brought the case back to 
court on that basis. However, virtually none of the cases included in either sample in-
volved multiple settlement agreements for this reason. It is also unlikely that there is a 
selection bias such that cases that have multiple settlement agreements are more likely 
to be those in which the landlord failed to make repairs. Obligations in settlement 
agreements for a tenant to repay arrears and for a landlord to make repairs are not con-
strued as mutually dependent, and thus a landlord’s failure to make repairs is not 
grounds for the tenant to fail to comply with his or her repayment obligations. Thus, a 
tenant electing to not make her arrears payment because of the landlord’s failure to 
comply with its repair obligations would essentially be subjecting herself to the possibil-
ity of immediate eviction without the benefit of the warranty of habitability as a defense. 
 211 If the initial settlement agreement includes a possessory judgment for the land-
lord, the landlord’s next step toward eviction will be to issue a warrant of eviction. The 
tenant will then have to file an order to show cause to bring the case back to court. If the 
initial settlement agreement does not include a possessory judgment for the landlord, 
the landlord’s next step toward eviction will be to file a motion in court seeking a judg-
ment and issuance of a warrant of eviction. This motion will bring the case back to court. 
 212 In some cases, either or both of the parties will choose to go before the judge for a 
hearing rather than enter into a new settlement agreement. Such cases were excluded 
from the analysis described in this Section. 
 213 It is possible that tenants are lying and saying that repairs are still needed after 
the repairs have already been completed. However, there does not appear to be an incen-
tive for tenants to make such a misrepresentation. Tenants are not excused from their 
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settlement agreements and the first agreement included an or-
der for the landlord to make repairs, the fact that the same re-
pairs are not ordered in a subsequent agreement (entered into 
after the access dates for repairs in the first agreement have 
passed) strongly suggests that the landlord complied with the 
initial repair order. Thus, the frequency of each outcome was 
calculated to determine the extent to which landlords comply 
with repair orders included in settlement agreements. The find-
ings indicate that repair orders were not complied with in nearly 
three-quarters of all cases where the data allow for this analysis. 
Two other case activities serve as additional indicators of 
the extent to which the warranty of habitability is effectively 
used to improve housing quality within eviction cases: the fre-
quency with which judges order Housing Code inspections, and 
the frequency with which judges access Housing Code enforce-
ment records.214 As described in Part III.B, judges presiding over 
nonpayment of rent eviction cases have broad authority to order 
the Housing Code enforcement agency to perform an inspection 
of the unit.215 This authority is significant because it allows 
judges to use the information they gather through eviction cases 
regarding conditions to trigger a parallel enforcement system. 
Where a tenant reports that she does not have heat, for example, 
the judge’s order of a Housing Code inspection means that if the 
tenant’s report is accurate, the Housing Code enforcement agen-
cy will initiate its own action against the landlord to ensure the 
repair is made. The landlord’s obligation to repair thus will no 
longer be tied to the eviction case, nor will it depend on the ten-
ant’s ability or willingness to enforce the judge’s repair order.216 
 
repayment obligations, nor do they receive any other direct benefits, as a result of the 
landlord’s failure to comply with the repair order. 
 214 See Steinberg, 42 L & Soc Inquiry at 1083–84 (cited in note 22) (highlighting the 
“housing inspector’s central role in prompting landlords to repair housing code  
violations,” in part through their roles as fact finders, in the context of the Housing  
Conditions Court in Washington, DC). 
 215 Although the form judges use to solicit a Housing Code inspection of a unit is 
termed a “Judicial Request/Order for Housing Inspection,” in practice an inspection is 
always scheduled once a judge completes the form. Thus, I describe this authority as the 
authority to “order” a Code inspection, although technically speaking the authority is to 
“order or request” a Code inspection. See note 172. 
 216 If a landlord does not make a repair as ordered in an eviction case settlement 
agreement, the tenant must bring the failure to repair to the court’s attention for a judge 
to enforce the order. There are many barriers to the effectiveness of this enforcement 
mechanism: tenants may not be aware of or know how to bring the failure to the court’s 
attention; tenants may fear retaliation if they choose to bring the failure to the court’s 
attention; and tenants may not want to risk keeping their eviction case open (by bringing 
the failure to the court’s attention) if they continue to owe the landlord rent. 
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Judges also have the ability to access Code enforcement rec-
ords, which include the history of complaints, inspections, and 
violations issued within the prior year. The ability to obtain 
these records is significant because it means that the judge has 
access to external, objective information about the conditions of 
the tenant’s unit, which, as Professor Franzese argues, should 
help promote enforcement of the warranty of habitability.217 The 
availability of the database also means that a judge can easily 
know whether the Housing Code enforcement agency is already 
aware of or involved in the conditions in the tenant’s unit. A 
judge who is concerned about a tenant’s report of serious condi-
tions of disrepair can know whether it is worth ordering a Code 
inspection, or whether doing so would be duplicative because the 
agency is already involved. In other words, this integration 
should help encourage judges’ appropriate use of their authority 
to order Housing Code inspections. 
Despite the integration of the Code enforcement and Hous-
ing Court systems, the data show that judges rarely use these 
tools to enforce the warranty and promote repair issues in the 
tenant’s unit. The full results of the analyses are reported and 
described below. 
1. All nonpayment of rent cases. 
In nonpayment of rent cases in which substantial repair or-
ders were included in the original settlement agreement and the 
parties entered into a subsequent settlement agreement after 
the access dates in the original settlement agreement had 
passed, the subsequent agreement included the same repair ob-
ligations 72 percent of the time.218 Judges invoked their authori-
ty to order a Housing Code inspection in only 1.2 percent of all 
nonpayment of rent cases. Perhaps even more striking, such an 
inspection was ordered in only 0.4 percent of cases in which sub-
stantial repairs were included in the settlement agreement 
where there were no open Housing Code violations at the time of 
case filing or complaints made to the Code enforcement agency 
within six months prior to the filing. 
 
 217 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 27 (cited in note 19). 
 218 It is not possible to tell from the data the extent to which repairs are not per-
formed because the tenant does not provide access on the agreed upon dates. 
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2. Violation cases. 
In violation cases in which substantial repair orders were 
included in the original settlement agreement and the parties 
entered into a subsequent settlement agreement after the access 
dates in the original agreement had passed, the subsequent 
agreement included the same repair obligations 80 percent of 
the time. Judges invoked their authority to order a Housing 
Code inspection in only 1.8 percent of all violation cases. At the 
same time, there is little evidence that judges were aware of 
open Housing Code violations in the unit. A printout of the 
online record of the Code enforcement history of the unit was in-
cluded in the case file in only 5.7 percent of cases, even though 
there were open Code violations in every case included in this 
dataset.219 
While judges may have accessed the Code enforcement da-
tabase and not printed out a paper copy of the record for the file, 
circumstances suggest that such behavior would be unlikely. For 
one, it is typically court attorneys (attorneys who assist the 
judge in the courtroom) who access online records, and a 
printout of the record would be the most likely method of pre-
senting the record to the judge. Second, it makes logical sense 
that judges (through their court attorneys) would print out and 
preserve the record once they have accessed it. Complete evic-
tion case file records exist only in hard paper copy, rather than 
in any electronic database, and thus in the context of this sys-
tem, the practical action for judges to take upon accessing an 
online record related to a case would be to add it to the paper 
file. Moreover, cases tend to involve multiple court appearances, 
and thus judges who accessed this record would likely want to 
remind themselves of the record in a later court appearance. 
Thus, the finding that a paper copy of the Code enforcement rec-
ord was in the file in only 5.7 percent of cases likely reflects the 
frequency with which the judge indeed accessed the record.220 
3. Discussion. 
These findings strongly suggest that the warranty of habita-
bility is not serving as an effective tool to compel the performance 
 
 219 Records of Housing Code violations are accessible through a centralized public 
online database. 
 220 This outcome was not measured in the “all nonpayment of rent cases” dataset 
because very few of those cases had open code violations in the unit, and thus it would 
have been difficult to interpret the meaning of the rate there. 
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of needed repairs. In the overwhelming majority of cases in 
which repairs were ordered in settlement agreements, it appears 
that landlords did not in fact follow through on their obligations. 
To be sure, it is unknown to what extent landlords later complied 
with their obligations even though they did not comply on the 
scheduled access dates. However, the fact that between 72 and 
80 percent of repairs appeared to have not been performed on the 
scheduled access dates strongly suggests that landlord’s repair 
obligations are not being effectively enforced in the course of 
nonpayment of rent eviction cases. 
The findings also indicate that judges rarely utilized the 
tools available to them to hold landlords accountable for needed 
repairs. Judges invoked their authority to order Housing Code 
inspections in only a tiny share of cases, despite tenants’  
frequent reporting of serious conditions of disrepair. Had they 
done so, they would have triggered an overlapping enforcement 
system that should have then provided an additional layer of 
landlord accountability. Thus, even if the Housing Court judges 
were not able to unilaterally enforce habitability laws, they 
would have activated a system that perhaps could do so more 
 effectively. However, judges did not follow this path. 
Judges also rarely took advantage of the opportunity to 
learn the Housing Code enforcement history at the unit. In the 
violation dataset, judges accessed the Code enforcement history 
only 5.7 percent of the time. Thus, nearly 95 percent of the time 
that there were code violations at the unit, the judge was likely 
unaware of this fact (or did not have the full information regard-
ing which violations were still outstanding and which had been 
cleared). This finding further indicates that judges’ failure to 
frequently order Housing Code inspections was not simply a re-
sponse to their awareness that the Code enforcement agency 
was already involved with the unit. Rather, the finding suggests 
that judges generally are not aware of code violations that exist 
in tenants’ units, and yet still decline to order code inspections 
when tenants report defective conditions. 
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D. Question 4: To the Extent It Exists, Is the Warranty of 
Habitability Operationalization Gap Simply a Result of the 
Lack of Legal Representation? 
The data showed that legal representation substantially  
affected tenants’ ability to benefit from the warranty of habitabil-
ity.221 Represented tenants with meritorious warranty of habita-
bility claims were at least nine times more likely than unrepre-
sented tenants with meritorious claims to receive a rent 
abatement.222 Except where there were open code violations in the 
unit, unrepresented tenants virtually never received abatements 
when they had meritorious claims. Approximately one in four 
represented tenants, meanwhile, received abatements when they 
had meritorious claims, whether identified based on either of the 
two sets of criteria in the “all nonpayment cases” dataset or the 
presence of open code violations. These findings strongly suggest 
that the lack of legal representation is an important contributor 
to the operationalization gap that has been detected. 
However, the findings also show that the lack of legal repre-
sentation does not fully account for the operationalization gap. 
Although rent abatements were much more frequent where ten-
ants had legal counsel, rent abatements were not the norm in 
meritorious claim cases even among cases in which the tenant 
was represented. Most represented tenants—approximately 
three-quarters—with meritorious warranty of habitability 
claims did not receive rent abatements, even when they had 
open code violations in their units. These findings suggest that 
factors beyond the lack of access to counsel are also responsible 
for the operationalization gap. 
As a preliminary matter, Pearson’s chi-squared tests were 
performed to test for selection bias in representation—that is, 
whether lawyers were choosing cases for representation based 
 
 221 These findings should be interpreted with some caution, as this study did not 
involve the randomized assignment of representation. The cases compared have equally 
strong evidence of warranty of habitability claims; however, it is possible that there are 
other factors that led counsel to accept some cases and not others. For example, counsel 
may have selected cases based on the presence of other claims and defenses, or because 
of the willingness of the tenant to participate in the case. However, to the extent these 
factors affected the selection of cases for representation, the results are likely biased  
upward so as to overestimate the impact of legal representation. 
 222 The length of repayment periods and the rate of possessory judgments were not 
compared because the sample size among represented tenants was too small to obtain 
results with statistical significance. 
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on the strength of the warranty of habitability claim.223 In the 
“all nonpayment cases” dataset, the tenant was unrepresented 
by counsel in 91 percent of all nonpayment cases, and repre-
sented by counsel in 9 percent of cases. To test for selection bias, 
I first looked at whether represented cases were more likely to 
include substantial repairs in the settlement agreement. The  
results showed that there was no statistically significant differ-
ence among the rate at which repairs were included in settle-
ment agreements between represented and unrepresented  
cases.224 Next, I looked at whether represented cases were more 
likely to assert needed repairs in the Answer and/or to include 
substantial repairs in multiple settlement agreements. The re-
sults showed that the incidence was exactly the same—
11 percent—where the tenants were represented and unrepre-
sented. Pearson’s chi-squared tests again showed that there was 
no statistically significant difference between these rates. Thus, 
these results indicate that it is unlikely that lawyers were select-
ing cases for representation based on the presence of a meritori-
ous warranty of habitability claim; overall, tenants had meritori-
ous warranty claims at the same rate whether they were or were 
not represented. The full results are reported in Table 6 below. 
  
 
 223 It is unknown to what extent the substantial repairs needed in the represented 
versus unrepresented cases were equivalent. Thus, it is possible that counsel were  
selecting for cases with more serious needed repairs, or for cases where more evidence 
existed documenting the severity of the repairs and notice to the landlord. 
 224 Specifically, substantial repairs were included in the settlement agreement in 
51 percent of unrepresented cases and 53 percent of represented cases. 
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TABLE 6: PRESENCE OF CONDITIONS OF DISREPAIR IN 
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and repairs in 
Answer 
11% 11% 0.84 
No conditions 
of disrepair 
31% 23% — 
 
 A similar analysis was performed to test for selection bias in 
the violation dataset. In this dataset, the tenant was unrepre-
sented by counsel in 79 percent of cases and represented by 
counsel in 21 percent of cases. To test for selection bias in repre-
sentation, Welch’s two-sample t-tests compared the number of 
open violations in unrepresented versus represented cases. Cas-
es in which the tenant was represented had an average of 1.5 
Class A, 0.6 Class B, and 4.3 Class C violations open at the time 
of case filing. Cases in which the tenant was unrepresented had 
an average of 1.3 Class A, 0.4 Class B, and 3.6 Class C violations 
open at the time of case filing. The differences between these 
two groups, compared separately for each code violation class 
level, also were not statistically significant. These findings 
strongly suggest that counsel did not select cases for representa-
tion based on the number or severity of open code violations in 
the unit at the time of case filing. The full statistical results are 
reported in Table 7 below. 
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TABLE 7: OPEN CODE VIOLATIONS IN REPRESENTED VERSUS 
UNREPRESENTED CASES 
 









Class A 1.5 1.3 0.43 
Class B  0.6 0.4 0.51 
Class C 4.3 3.6 0.07 
 
1. All nonpayment cases. 
Pearson’s chi-squared tests were performed to test for dif-
ferences in the rate of rent abatements among represented and 
unrepresented tenants with meritorious warranty claims. The 
results revealed that for tenants with the same evidence of con-
ditions of disrepair, there were substantial and statistically sig-
nificant differences in abatement outcomes based on representa-
tion status. Where substantial repairs were included in the first 
settlement agreement, the abatement rate was 27 percent for 
represented tenants compared with 0 percent for unrepresented 
tenants. Where substantial repairs were included in multiple 
settlement agreements and repairs were asserted in the Answer, 
the abatement rate was 30 percent for represented tenants com-
pared with 0 percent for unrepresented tenants.225 The full sta-
tistical results are reported in Table 8 below. 
2. Violation cases. 
Pearson’s chi-squared tests were also performed to test for 
differences in the rate of rent abatements among represented 
and unrepresented tenants with meritorious warranty claims, 
where merit is indicated by open code violations. The results 
showed that where there were open Class B or Class C viola-
tions at the unit at the time of case filing, the abatement rate 
was 27 percent for represented tenants compared with 3 percent 
for unrepresented tenants, and that this difference was statisti-
cally significant. Thus, legal representation had a demonstrated 
positive effect on the ability of tenants to successfully invoke the 
 
 225 Where repairs were asserted in the Answer, the abatement rate was 22 percent 
for represented tenants compared with 1 percent for unrepresented tenants. 
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warranty of habitability. This finding is consistent with the find-
ing in the “all nonpayment cases” dataset, which likewise 
showed that representation affected tenants’ likelihood of bene-
fiting from the warranty. The full statistical results are reported 
in Table 8 below. 
TABLE 8: ABATEMENT RATES IN REPRESENTED VERSUS 
UNREPRESENTED CASES 




















and repairs in  
Answer* 
30% 0% 0.003 
Violation cases 27% 3% 0.003 
No conditions of 
disrepair** 
0% 0% — 
* One of two “meritorious claim” groups among all  
nonpayment of rent cases 
** “No meritorious claim” group 
3. Discussion. 
The findings show that legal representation substantially 
affects a tenant’s likelihood of receiving a rent abatement when 
he or she has a meritorious warranty of habitability claim. 
Strikingly, they demonstrate that the warranty of habitability is 
all but inaccessible to tenants without counsel who appear to 
satisfy the elements of the claim but who do not have open code 
violations at their units. Tenants are simply unable to reap the 
benefit of the claim prescribed by the law on paper—a rent 
abatement—when they are unrepresented. Represented tenants 
with the same evidence of conditions of disrepair have a one-in-
four or one-in-three chance of receiving a rent abatement. The 
warranty is slightly more useful to unrepresented tenants where 
there are open code violations in the unit, with 3 percent receiv-
ing rent abatements. However, the impact of representation is 
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still extremely significant. Represented tenants are nine times 
as likely to receive a rent abatement as compared to unrepre-
sented tenants who have the same number and class levels of 
open code violations at their units. Representation, in short, 
dramatically affects the ability of tenants to benefit from the 
warranty of habitability. 
At the same time, these findings indicate that representa-
tion does not fully account for the operationalization gap in the 
warranty of habitability. At most, between one-quarter and one-
third of represented tenants with meritorious warranty of hab-
itability claims receive rent abatements. This means that at 
least two-thirds of tenants with meritorious warranty claims do 
not benefit from the claim despite having legal representation. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
The findings of this study reshape our understanding of the 
effectiveness of the warranty of habitability. The findings pro-
vide the most conclusive evidence to date that there is a large 
operationalization gap in the law. All prior large-scale empirical 
studies on the warranty have measured the rate at which the 
claim was asserted or won within the overall population of non-
payment of rent eviction cases, without distinguishing between 
cases of tenants with and without meritorious claims. This prior 
research sounded the alarm that the law was likely ineffective, 
but left open the possibility that the low usage rate simply  
reflected a low rate of tenants with meritorious claims. This 
study addressed these methodological shortcomings by specifi-
cally measuring the size of the gap between tenants who have 
meritorious warranty claims and those who benefit from the 
law. It also took into account the possibility that tenants with 
meritorious claims were forgoing rent abatements—the relief 
explicitly provided under the law—in favor of other benefits in 
their cases. The results together showed that more than 
90 percent of tenants with meritorious claims did not benefit 
from the warranty at all. The results further revealed that ten-
ants were unable to use the law as a tool to secure needed  
repairs. While judges often ordered landlords to perform repairs, 
the data shows that landlords evaded compliance with the  
orders nearly three-quarters of the time. These findings strongly 
indicate that the warranty of habitability suffers from a major 
operationalization gap. 
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The results of this study are especially significant because 
they upend the traditional wisdom about the driving forces be-
hind the warranty’s ineffectiveness. Almost all of the existing 
scholarship on the warranty of habitability to date has attribut-
ed its failures to the barriers imposed by restrictive substantive 
doctrines and the lack of access to counsel. The findings here 
show that those explanations are inadequate. First, the study 
found that tenants’ claims have a low rate of effectiveness even 
where the law is unencumbered by restrictive substantive doc-
trines. New York’s warranty of habitability laws lack onerous 
notice, good faith withholding, or rent escrow requirements—
indeed, tenants face few formal hurdles to assertion of the claim. 
Existing scholarship would suggest that this backdrop would 
translate into widespread use of the claim.226 Yet the study 
found the opposite: very few tenants with meritorious claims  
actually benefited from the law. 
It certainly may be the case that even fewer tenants benefit 
from the warranty of habitability where restrictive doctrines ex-
ist. However, the findings of this study demonstrate that these 
doctrines cannot, without more, explain the low usage rates of 
the law. This result has serious implications for policy.  
Proposals for legal reforms to the warranty of habitability, par-
ticularly those put forth by scholars and advocates in recent 
years, have focused primarily on the rollback of these restrictive 
doctrines.227 The findings suggest that those reforms are unlikely 
to result in widespread effectiveness of the law.228  
The study’s findings also disrupt our understandings and 
assumptions about the role of access to counsel in the effective-
ness of the warranty of habitability. While the data showed un-
ambiguously that representation mattered, it also revealed that 
the lack of access to counsel did not account for the majority of 
the warranty of habitability’s operationalization gap. This find-
ing has important implications for future research and policy. In 
2017, shortly after the period for which the data in this study 
was collected, New York City became the first jurisdiction in the 
United States to enact legislation establishing universal access 
 
 226 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 34 (cited in note 19); Super, 
99 Cal L Rev at 434–36 (cited in note 19); Tokarz and Schmook, 53 Wash U J L & Pol at 
178 (cited in note 86). 
 227 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 458–60 (cited in note 19); Franzese, Gorin, and 
Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 31–34 (cited in note 19). 
 228 See Part IV.D.  
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to counsel for low-income tenants in eviction proceedings.229 The 
legislation is being phased in over a five-year period such that 
all income-eligible tenants will be offered free legal counsel by 
2022.230 Other jurisdictions quickly followed suit: in 2018, a San 
Francisco ballot initiative established the right to counsel for all 
tenants in eviction cases, and Newark, New Jersey passed an 
ordinance guaranteeing representation to tenants under 
200 percent of the federal poverty line.231 A number of motiva-
tions underlie these initiatives, among them that the provision 
of counsel would lead to stronger outcomes for tenants and 
greater enforcement of existing protections.232 
While only a comprehensive and rigorous evaluation of the 
implementation of the laws will show their effects, the findings 
in this study suggest that they will likely enhance usage of the 
warranty of habitability for tenants with meritorious claims. In 
this regard, the study’s findings lend support to scholars’ con-
tentions that the lack of access to counsel acts as a barrier to the 
effectiveness of the warranty of habitability.233 They also bolster 
existing views that expanded access to counsel will improve out-
comes for tenants.234 However, the results also indicate that the 
provision of legal representation likely will not, on its own, be 
enough to expand the benefits of the warranty of habitability to 
all—or even most—tenants with meritorious claims. The study 
 
 229 See Vicki Been, et al, Implementing New York City’s Universal Access to Counsel 
Program: Lessons for Other Jurisdictions *2 (NYU Furman Center, Dec 11, 2018), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/L686-6L62 (Furman Center Report). 
 230 Id at *2 & n 2. 
 231 See Laura Waxmann, Tenant Advocacy Groups Set to Receive Funding Under 
‘Right to Counsel’ Program (San Francisco Examiner, Nov 28, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/HDG6-BKH5; Jared Brey, Tenants’ Right to Counsel on the Move, Next 
Stop Newark, (Next City, Jan 10, 2019) archived at https://perma.cc/PWD7-9S9H. Other 
jurisdictions have also introduced or piloted legislation to create similar policies, includ-
ing Boston, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC. See also Furman Center 
Report at *2 (cited in note 229); City of Boston, Mayor Walsh Announces 2019 Housing 
Security, Economic Mobility Legislative Agenda (Jan 7, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/8CU9-6Z2T. 
 232 See Furman Center Report at *3–6 (cited in note 229). 
 233 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 13 (cited in note 19);  
Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 84 (cited in note 28) (noting that “[t]he lack of counsel means 
that the parties are particularly dependent on the court to ensure that the rule of law is 
applied”); id at 86–87 (arguing that advocates hoping to improve utilization of the im-
plied warranty of habitability should not focus their efforts on access to counsel because 
the data suggest that all efforts thus far have faltered, and moreover the provision of 
additional lawyers would impose considerable resource demands on the courts). But see 
Bezdek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 538 n 16 (cited in note 27) (arguing against a solution in-
volving access to counsel because it is “parentalistic [sic] and it lets us off the hook for 
our parts in the charade of legal entitlement and rights vindication”). 
 234 See note 233. 
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showed that among tenants with meritorious claims who had le-
gal representation, 75 percent did not benefit from the claim. 
Thus, while universal access to counsel is likely to improve the 
effectiveness of the warranty, it is unlikely to serve as a cure-all. 
The findings also cast doubt on the argument that the war-
ranty’s ineffectiveness is attributable in part to the inaccessibil-
ity of Housing Code records. Professor Franzese has argued that 
in many jurisdictions, judges are without the tools to effectively 
enforce the warranty of habitability because there is no central-
ized and publicly available code violation database.235 Franzese 
has hypothesized that the availability of those records to judges 
through a centralized database would promote enforcement of 
the warranty.236 Unfortunately, findings here strongly indicate 
that the mere existence of such a system is not, without more, a 
cure-all for improving the usage of the warranty. Judges in New 
York City have precisely the tools Franzese identified—indeed, 
Franzese points to New York City’s integrated system as a mod-
el for other jurisdictions to follow—but the data show that judg-
es rarely took advantage of them. Moreover, few tenants bene-
fited from the warranty of habitability despite the existence of 
this integrated system.237 
These conclusions signal that current understandings of the 
barriers to use of the warranty of habitability are incomplete. 
None of the existing theories for the law’s ineffectiveness with-
stands empirical scrutiny. While the data show that some of the 
identified barriers, such as lack of access to counsel, certainly 
contribute to the claim’s underuse, they also show that these 
barriers cannot account for the scope of the underuse. 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly fifty years ago, the US Court of Appeals for the  
District of Columbia Circuit declared that the warranty of hab-
itability was implied in all residential leases. Proponents hailed 
the development as a revolution in tenants’ rights. Professor 
Myron Moskovitz, writing in the California Law Review shortly 
after the first jurisdictions adopted the implied warranty of hab-
itability, predicted that by giving tenants the power to enforce 
 
 235 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 37 (cited in note 19). 
 236 Id at 22. 
 237 These findings suggest that a more tightly structured system for integrating evic-
tion case adjudication with code enforcement records, like that proposed by Professor Zu-
lack, may be needed to ensure that judges in fact take advantage of the availability of code 
enforcement records. See Zulack, 40 John Marshall L Rev at 449–53 (cited in note 146). 
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laws prohibiting substandard housing, the courts’ rulings would 
spur improvements to the quality of housing, particularly that 
enjoyed by low-income tenants in urban settings.238 The law 
would do so “not merely by adding to the number of enforcers,” 
but by allowing enforcement to be driven by those most affect-
ed.239 This Article presents the results of the first rigorous em-
pirical study assessing the effectiveness of the warranty of hab-
itability. The study demonstrates that tenants overwhelmingly 
do not benefit from the warranty even when they are likely to 
have meritorious claims. Specifically, the study found that a 
mere 2.35 to 9 percent of tenants with meritorious warranty of 
habitability claims receive rent abatements. The findings also 
ruled out the possibility that tenants are receiving other types of 
benefits from the claim, such as a longer repayment period or 
avoidance of a possessory judgment. And further, the findings 
indicate that the warranty of habitability does not serve as an 
effective tool within eviction cases to compel landlords to per-
form repairs—although the court often orders landlords to com-
plete repairs, the data strongly suggest that landlords rarely 
comply with these orders. 
This study was also the first to rigorously evaluate whether 
and to what extent legal representation affects a tenant’s likeli-
hood of benefiting from the warranty of habitability. It found 
that representation mattered significantly—tenants with meri-
torious warranty of habitability claims had between a 0 and 
3 percent chance of obtaining an abatement when they were un-
represented, compared with an approximately 27 percent chance 
when they had representation. This finding strongly supports 
providing increased access to counsel as one way to improve us-
age of the claim. Yet the findings should also sober expectations 
that a right to counsel will eliminate the warranty of habitabil-
ity operationalization gap. Approximately 73 percent of tenants 
who had meritorious claims and were represented by counsel 
still did not benefit from the law. 
The findings of the study also caution against an overfocus 
on the onerous substantive doctrines that exist in some jurisdic-
tions. While those doctrines may very well impose additional 
barriers to the implementation of the warranty where they exist, 
 
 238 See Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine 
Raising New Issues, 62 Cal L Rev 1444, 1504 (1974). Moskovitz further hailed the new 
law as providing greater bargaining leverage to tenants in settlement negotiations with 
their landlords in eviction cases. Id. 
 239 Id at 1503. 
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the results here show that their existence does not fully—or 
even primarily—account for the operationalization gap. Even 
where the warranty of habitability is unencumbered by these 
doctrines, it is still not widely enforced. 
These conclusions signal strongly that more quantitative 
and qualitative research is needed to identify other procedural 
and/or substantive legal barriers to the claim’s usage beyond 
those identified by the existing scholarship. Preliminary qualita-
tive and legal research conducted in conjunction with the quan-
titative research presented here suggests that nondiscretionary 
cure period rules severely restrict the use of the warranty. Until 
2019,240 New York had a nondiscretionary cure period rule,  
codified at New York RPAPL § 747-a but commonly known as 
the Five-Day Rule, which provided that if a landlord has ob-
tained a judgment in a nonpayment eviction proceeding and 
“more than five days has elapsed,” then “the court shall not 
grant a stay of the issuance or execution of any warrant of evic-
tion” until the tenant has paid the amount of the judgment.241 In 
the context of the warranty of habitability, the effect of this 
statute was that where a tenant is awarded a rent abatement at 
trial due to the landlord’s breach of the warranty of habitability, 
unless the rent abatement was for 100 percent of the arrears, 
the tenant would be required to pay the balance of the rent owed 
within five days in order to avoid eviction. 
Statutes like the Five-Day Rule are quite common across ju-
risdictions, yet have received virtually no scholarly attention in 
discussions of the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability.242 
At least seven other states have equivalent rules providing for 
very short, nondiscretionary cure periods upon a finding of rent 
owed to the landlord.243 The cure periods established in these 
 
 240 All cases included in this study were from 2016. See Part III. 
 241 NY Real Prop Law § 747-a (1997), repealed by L2019, ch 36, pt M § 18 (effective 
June 14, 2019). 
 242 No scholarly publication of which I am aware has referenced cure period  
restrictions as a factor in the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability. 
 243 See Cal Civ Pro Code § 1174.2(a) (five-day cure period which judge has no au-
thority to extend); 25 Del Code Ann § 5716 (ten-day cure period if “good faith dispute” 
caused the nonpayment); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 239, § 8A (seven-day nondiscretionary 
cure period); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 600.5744(4) (nondiscretionary ten-day cure period); 
NM Stat Ann § 47-8-33.E(2) (three-day nondiscretionary cure period so long as tenant 
complies with requirements of state’s rent withholding statute); 12 Okla Stat Ann 
§ 1148.10B.B (three-day nondiscretionary period conditional upon tenant’s compliance 
with certain notice requirements); Wash Rev Code Ann § 59.18.410 (five-day nondiscre-
tionary cure period). 
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states range from three to ten days.244 Even worse, at least thirty 
states provide tenants no cure rights at all.245 Thus, in these ju-
risdictions, if at the conclusion of trial the judge determines that 
the tenant owes one dollar of rent or more, the tenant has no op-
portunity to satisfy the balance and will face near-immediate 
eviction. This outcome is the same regardless of whether the ten-
ant has withheld rent for defective conditions in good faith and/or 
whether the court has awarded the tenant a partial rent abate-
ment for the landlord’s violation of the warranty of habitability. 
These rules significantly increase the risks of taking a non-
payment of rent case to trial for the purpose of securing a rent 
abatement. As shown by the data here, repayment agreements 
will almost always provide tenants more than ten days to repay 
the arrears.246 That longer period of time is often necessary for 
tenants to save up enough money to pay down the balance, or to 
seek out and obtain charitable assistance. Thus, in jurisdictions 
with nondiscretionary cure periods, tenants are unwise to take a 
case to trial unless they are in possession of or have ready access 
to the balance of the arrears (whatever the amount of that bal-
ance may be, as determined by the judge). In jurisdictions with 
no cure rights, tenants who take their case to trial must be con-
fident that the amount of the rent abatement will exceed the 
amount of rent owed. 
Because cure period restrictions affect tenants’ risks of tak-
ing a case to trial for the purpose of achieving a rent abatement, 
they also heavily influence tenants’ ability to negotiate a rent 
 
 244 See note 243. 
 245 See Ala Code Ann § 35-9A-461(e); Ala Rule Civ P 62(a), 62(dc); Alaska Stat Ann 
§§ 34.03.190, 34.03.220(b); Ariz Rev Stat § 12-1178.C; Colo Rev Stat Ann § 13-40-122; Ga 
Code Ann § 44-7-53; Hawaii Rev Stat §§ 666-11, 666-14; Idaho Code § 6-316; 735 ILCS 
5/9-209; Ind Code Ann § 32-31-1-6; Iowa Code § 562A.27; Kan Stat Ann § 58-2561; Ky 
Rev Ann Stat § 383.240; La Civ Code Ann § 2704; Md Real Prop Code Ann § 8-401(e)(1); 
Minn Stat §§ 504B.291, 504B.285; Miss Code Ann §§ 11-25-23, 89-7-41; Mo Rev Stat 
§ 535.020; Mont Code Ann § 70-24-427; Neb Rev Stat § 76-1446; Nev Rev Stat Ann 
§ 40.414; NH Rev Stat Ann § 540.14; NJ Stat Ann § 2A:42-92; NC Gen Stat § 42-26; ND 
Cent Code § 47-32-01; Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1923.13; Or Rev Stat §§ 105.145, 105.161; 68 
Pa Cons Stat Ann § 250.503; RI Gen Laws § 34-18-51; SD Cod Laws § 21-16-1 et seq; 
Tenn Code Ann §§ 29-18-126, 66-28-501; Tex Rule Civ P 509, 510; Tex Prop Code 
§§ 92.056, 92.0561, 92.056; Utah Code Ann §§ 57-22-5, 57-22-6, 78B-6-808, 78B-6-811; 
Va Code Ann § 55.1-1251; W Va Code §§ 37-6-8, 37-6-19; Wis Stat § 799.44; Wyo Stat 
Ann §§ 1-21-1008, 1-21-1206(d). 
 246 The average length of the repayment period among all nonpayment of rent cases 
(in the “all nonpayment of rent cases” dataset) was 38.6 days. See Part IV.B.1. There 
was no statistically significant difference between the length of the repayment period in 
“likely meritorious claim” cases and “likely no meritorious claim” cases. 
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abatement in a settlement agreement.247 In jurisdictions with 
nondiscretionary cure rules, tenants who do not possess the 
amount of money likely to represent the remainder of the ar-
rears found owed are unable to successfully negotiate a rent 
abatement because they cannot make good on the threat of tak-
ing the case to trial. Similarly, in jurisdictions with no cure 
rights, tenants have little leverage to negotiate a rent abate-
ment because landlords know that tenants are unlikely to take 
their case to trial: if any amount of rent is found to be owed—
that is, if the rent abatement is any less than the full value of 
the arrears—the tenant will be evicted. 
Additional research should also explore whether the ineffec-
tiveness of the warranty of habitability is attributable to non-
doctrinal factors such as court culture or imbalances of power. 
The preliminary qualitative research conducted in conjunction 
with the quantitative research presented here suggests that a 
debt collection culture of the housing courts may play a signifi-
cant role.248 Some tenants described the Housing Court culture 
as treating landlords’ rights to collect rent more seriously than 
tenants’ rights to adequate housing. Tenants reported numerous 
instances of failed efforts to hold their landlords accountable for 
property conditions, which occurred simultaneously while they 
were being held responsible for their rental obligations. Accord-
ing to tenants’ accounts, their efforts failed not because their 
claims were invalid or because they were unfamiliar with the 
proper legal procedures, but because judges did not want to  
entertain them. 
Further research should be conducted into both of these—as 




 247 Settlements are negotiated “in the shadow of the law.” See generally Don L. 
Coursey and Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the Shadow of the 
Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 Intl Rev L & Econ 161 (1988); Robert Cooter, 
Stephen Marks, and Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable 
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J Legal Stud 225 (1982). According to this theory, parties 
justify their own settlement positions and evaluate the strength of the opposing side’s 
positions based on an analysis of likely outcomes and willingness to go to trial. Cooter, 
Marks, and Mnookin, 11 J Legal Stud at 228–29 (cited in note 247). Where one side is 
aware that the other side is unable to support their position at trial, or is unlikely to  
incur the risk involved with taking the case to trial, that side is unlikely to cede to the 
other side’s demands. Id at 245.  
 248 See, for example, Bezdek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 569 (cited in note 27) (qualitatively 
describing nonpayment of rent proceedings and calling them “scene[s] . . . of debt collection”). 
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APPENDIX: CASE FILE CODING GUIDELINES 
Background Information About the Case 
Criteria Coding Guideline 
Rent-regulation  
status of the unit 
This information was coded based on 
the landlord’s assertion of the rent-
regulation status in the petition.249 
Units were classified in one of three cat-
egories: rent-regulated status, market 
status, and nonprofit or government-
owned. 
Legal representation  Tenants were coded as either repre-
sented or unrepresented based on 
whether they had representation at the 
time they entered into the first settle-
ment agreement.  
 
Answer 
Criteria Coding Guideline 
Date of Answer The date the tenant completed the An-
swer was marked. 
Whether repairs are 
asserted in the  
Answer 
Cases were coded either “yes” or “no.” 
The pro se Answer form includes a 
checkbox option which states, “There are 
or were conditions in the apartment 
and/or the building/house which the Peti-
tioner did not repair and/or services 
which the Petitioner did not provide.” 
“Yes” was marked when the box was 
checked, and “No” was marked when the 
box was blank, unless the tenant later re-
ceived leave of court to amend the An-
swer and in the Amended Answer includ-
ed a similar claim asserting conditions of 
disrepair (including an express claim for 
breach of the warranty of habitability).  
 
 249 An eviction complaint is referred to as a “petition” under New York law. Land-
lords are required to state the rent-regulation status of the unit in the petition. See NY 
Real Prop Law § 741. 
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Criteria Coding Guideline 
Whether a service 
defect is asserted 
The pro se Answer form includes two 
checkbox options related to service de-
fects: (1) “I did not receive the Notice of 
Petition and Petition” and (2) “I received 
the Notice of Petition and Petition, but 
service was not correct as required by 
law.” “Yes” was marked when either of 
the boxes was checked, and “No” was 
marked when both boxes were blank,  
unless the tenant later received leave  
of court to amend the Answer and in the 
Amended Answer asserted a service  
defect. 
Case Outcomes 
Criteria Coding Guideline 
Date of first settle-
ment agreement 
The date of the first settlement agree-




cludes a judgment 
for the landlord 
This was coded as “yes” or “no” based on 
whether the first settlement agreement 
granted a judgment for possession to the 
landlord. Where the case was discontin-
ued, this outcome was coded as 
“DISCON.” Cases that went to trial were 
marked “TRIAL.” 
Number of days for 
payment of the  
arrears 
The number of days between the date 
the settlement agreement was entered 
and the date the arrears were due. 
Where the settlement agreement set a 
schedule for incremental repayments 
over a period of time longer than sixty 
days, the outcome was coded as “pay 
agreement.” Where the settlement 
agreement set a schedule for incremen-
tal repayments over a period of time 
shorter than sixty days, the length of 
time was calculated based on the final 
date on which repayment would be due. 
Where the case was discontinued, this 
outcome was coded as “DISCON.” All 
coding was based on the first settlement 
220 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:145 
Criteria Coding Guideline 
agreement. Cases that went to trial were 
marked “TRIAL.”  
Amount of arrears 
owed  
The amount owed was as stated on the 
settlement agreement as the amount of 
arrears due and owing. Where a rent 
abatement was awarded, the abatement 
amount was not reflected. Ongoing use 
and occupancy also was not included. 
“DISCON” was coded for discontinued 
cases. All coding was based on the first 
settlement agreement.  
Whether the settle-
ment agreement re-
quires the landlord 
to make substantial 
repairs 
This was coded as “yes”/“no.” “Yes” was 
coded where the settlement agreement 
included repairs of conditions that quali-
fy as rent impairing pursuant to NY 
Multiple Dwelling Law § 302-a. “Yes” 
was also coded where the agreement in-
cluded repairs of conditions that have 
been found to constitute a violation of 
the warranty of habitability, which in-
cludes, inter alia: lack of heat and/or hot 
water; flooding; fumes and/or smoke, 
leaking gas; lead paint; bedbugs; mold; 
broken appliances (for example, refriger-
ator or stove); cockroaches; secondhand 
smoke; mice and/or rats; noise and/or 
dust; failure to install kitchen facilities, 
and broken locks. 
Whether there are 
multiple settlement 
agreements 
This was coded as “yes” or “no” only if 
the first settlement agreement included 
substantial repairs. “NA” was marked  
if the first settlement agreement did  
not include substantial repairs or was a 
discontinuance.  
Same repairs in  
multiple settlement 
agreements 
Coded as “yes” if there are multiple set-
tlement agreements and a subsequent 
settlement agreement requires the land-
lord to make the same repairs as re-
quired by the first settlement agreement 
and the access dates in the first settle-
ment agreement have passed. Marked as 
“no” if there are substantial repairs in 
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Criteria Coding Guideline 
the first settlement agreement and the 
same repairs are not included in a  
subsequent settlement agreement but 
the access dates have passed. Marked  
as “NA” if the access dates have not 
passed or if there were not substantial 
repairs included in the first settlement 
agreement.  
Abatement Coded as “yes” or “no” based on whether 
the settlement agreement expressly 
stated that the landlord granted the ten-
ant a rent abatement.  
Abatement amount The dollar amount of the abatement 
awarded. 
Amount of arrears 
owed of $7,000, 
$9,000, or $11,000 
Coded as “yes” or “no” based on whether 
the amount of arrears owed as stated on 
the settlement agreement was either 
$7,000, $9,000, or $11,000. 
Prospective setting of 
rent 
Coded as “yes” or “no” based on whether 
the settlement agreement prospectively 
sets the tenant’s rent.  
 
Housing Code Enforcement 
Criteria Coding Guideline 
HPD record in file This was coded as “yes” or “no” based on 
whether there was a printed-out record 
of the Code enforcement history of the 
unit in the case file.  
Housing Code inspec-
tion order/request 
This was coded as “yes” or “no” based on 
whether the judge submitted a stand-
ardized form titled “Judicial Re-
quest/Order for Housing Inspection.”  
 
